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Although  the  Home  Front  in  Britain  during  the  First  World  War  has  received  a  great   
 
deal  more  attention  in  recent  years,  the  role  of  the  railways  has  been  largely  
 
overlooked.  Yet  the  railways  were  crucial  in  maintaining  the  war  effort  and  wartime  
 
economy,  transporting  not  only  weaponry  and  troops,  but  food  items  for  both  the  
 
domestic  population  and  the  forces;  mail  travelling  to  and  from  the  front  lines,  and  
 
essential  commodities  such  as  coal  for  the  nation’s  navy.  This  dissertation  considers  the  
 
impact  of  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  through  analysis  of  the  worst  disaster  in  British  
 
railway  history  at  Quintinshill  on  the  22nd  of  May  1915.  Five  trains  were  in  involved  in  a  
 
catastrophic  collision  leading  to  the  loss  of  226  military  and  civilian  lives.  By  utilizing  
 
documents  detailing  the  coordination  of  the  railways  by  the  Railway  Executive   
 
Committee,  and  exploring  the  events  at  Quintinshill  using  the  official  report  into  the   
 
disaster,  as  well  as  newspaper  reports  and  company  documents,  the  operation  of  the   
 
railways  under  wartime  conditions  is  examined.  Using  the  Quintinshill  disaster  as  a  prism   
 
through  which  to  analyse  the  issues,  the  extreme  pressures  faced  by  the  railways  and   
 
the  people  that  operated  them  during  this  crucial  period  have  been  examined,  showing   
 
how  normal  protocols  dictating  safe  operations  on  the  railways  were  being  neglected   
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Introduction 
The  Importance  of  the  Railways  to  Britain’s  War  Effort 
  
 
The  railways  were  crucial  to  enabling  Britain  to  fulfil  her  First  World  War  aims  and   
maintain  the  war  effort  of  the  entire  nation.  The  transport  system,  originating  in  the   
first  decades  of  the  previous  century,  had  by  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  expanded   
to  the  extent  that  virtually  every  centre  of  population  across  the  nation  was  serviced  by   
a  rail  connection. 
 
Over  the  course  of  the  previous  decade  there  has  been  an  upsurge  in  interest  in  the   
role  of  Britain’s  Home  Front  during  the  First  World  War,  and  this  is  undoubtedly  linked   
to  the  centenary  commemorations  of  the  war  as  a  whole.  This  renewed  focus  however   
has  centred  on  aspects  of  the  war  that  directly  influenced  the  course  of  hostilities,  be   
that  the  politics  behind  the  British  war  machine,  the  increase  in  munitions  production,   
and  the  changing  role  of  workers.   
 
Although  it  is  widely  accepted  that  the  railways  were  a  vital  part  of  Britain’s  war  effort,  
little  focus  has  been  placed  on  the  role  they  played  during  the  conflict  and  how  it  was  
the  railways  that  allowed  Britain  to  wage  a  truly  mechanized  war.  Any  focus  that  has  
been  placed  on  the  railways  appears  to  fall  into  one  of  two  tendencies.  The  first  being  
passing  reference  to  the  role  the  railways  played  in  wider  histories  about  First  World  
War  which,  although  interesting,  inevitably  focus  on  the  home  front  during  the  war,  or  
the  military  campaigns  of  the  front.  The  second  line  of  focus  comes  from  the  more  
specialized  ‘Railway  History’  sphere  of  enquiry.  Whilst  this  line  of  research  is  much  more  
detailed  than  the  first  line  of  focus,  specialized  railway  histories  prefer  to  investigate  
either  the  staff  who  operated  the  railways,  or  the  place  of  the  railways  on  the  front  
lines  with  the  War  Department  Light  Railways  sector  of  the  Royal  Engineers.  This  leaves  
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the  railways  of  mainland  Britain  vastly  underrepresented  in  the  histories  of  the  railways  
at  war,  being  relegated  to  only  a  handful  of  texts  and  the  occasional  few  pages  of  
information  written  in  the  last  five  decades.  Furthermore,  texts  which  do  contain   
reference  to  the  railways  rarely  acknowledge  operations  on  the  network  beyond  the   
establishment  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee  as  a  subcommittee  of  general   
wartime  governance,  meaning  that  an  entire  element  of  Britain’s  wartime  story  has  been   
severely  underrepresented.  
 
Invariably  when  investigating  the  role  of  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War,  the  
term  ‘Quintinshill’  is  going  to  arise.  To  a  non-rail enthusiast,  this  term  can  seem  quite   
obscure,  but  to  individuals  whom  hold  an  interest in  the  history  of  the  railways,  this   
term  is  the  shorthand  for  Britain’s  worst  rail  disaster in  the  long  history  of  the  transport   
network.  Yet  this  disaster,  the  only  near  comparison  of  which  being  the  Harrow  and   
Wealdstone  disaster  of  1952  in  terms  of  fatalities;  and  the  Hawes  junction  disaster  of   
1910  in  terms  of  overall  damage  to  rolling  stock,  is  by  and  large  forgotten  by  members   
of  the  general  public.  Yet  this  disaster  provides  an  interesting  angle  in  which  to  examine   
the  operations  of  the  railways,  both  in  general  terms  surrounding  railway  practices  of   
that  period,  and  in  the  more  specific  sphere  of  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War.   
In  recent  years,  there  have  been  a  small  selection  of  texts  written  focusing  on  the   
disaster  itself  and  the  significance  that  it  plays  to  the  story  of  1915,  but  these  texts   
have  not  used  the  disaster  as  a  means  of  exploring  and  investigating  operations  on  the   
railways  during  the  First  World  War,  and  the  complexities  that  operating  a  network   
designed  in  peacetime  had  when  the  wartime  conditions  took  full  precedent.  
 
Given  the  period  of  1915  in  which  the  Quintinshill  disaster  occurred,  it   is  perhaps  easy  
to  see  why  general  histories  of  the  First  World  War  may  overlook  this  event.  Happening  
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on  the  22nd  of  May  1915,  the  disaster  came  at  the  height  of  the  so  called  ‘shell  crisis’,  
wherein  British  forces  were  suffering  from  a  severe  shortage  of  munitions  at  the  front  
lines,  as  well  as  being  only  weeks  after  the  torpedo  attack  and  subsequent  sinking  of  
RMS  Lusitannia  off  of  the  coast  of  Ireland,  with  the  result  being  1,198  deaths  on  board  
with  only  761  survivors.  As  well  as  this,  the  events  that  unfurled  at  Quintinshill  came  
shortly  before  the  collapse  of  the  Asquith  government  and  the  establishment  of  the   
wartime  coalition,  as  well  as  happening  during  the  infamous  Gallipoli  and  Dardanelles   
campaigns  in  Turkey.  Evaluation  of  these  other  subject  areas  is  far  more prevalent  in   
existing  studies  surrounding  the  First  World  War.  Even  within  devoted  texts  however,   
the  focus  is  more  on  the  staff  behind  the  disaster  and  the  criminal  trial  of  these  men,   
the  impact  to  the  railway  is  not  mentioned  in  any  great  detail,  and  this  is  something  of   
an  oversight  on  behalf  of  authors  that  have  written  before.  
 
This  study  will  focus  on  the  events  of  the  Quintinshill  rail  disaster  and  examine  the  
obvious  questions  that  have  been  largely  overlooked,  what  went  wrong  on  the  morning   
of  the  22nd  of  May  1915,  and  was  this  disaster  a  byproduct  of  the  wider  wartime   
situation,  with  regard  to  pressure  on  the  railways  and  the  people  that  ran  them?  In   
order  to  achieve  this  however,  it  is  first  important  to  place  the  railways  of  Britain  into   
the  sphere  of  the  wider  war  narrative.  For  this  reason  chapter  one  will  explore  the   
operations  of  the  railways  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee  for   
the  war  period,  examining  aspects  such  as  the  transportation  of  troops  to  and  from  the   
theatres  of  war;  the  transportation  of  materials  required  for  the  war effort,  and  the   
provisions  in  place  to  allow  the  railways  to operate  at  maximum  capacity  in  favour  of   
the  war  effort.  This  allows  chapters  two  and  three  to  focus  on  the Quintinshill  study   
detailing  the  events  of  the  morning  of  the  22nd  of  May  1915  and  how they  became   
possible,  and  the  following  reaction,  both  in  terms  of  the  general  public, and  in  the   
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corridors  of  power,  resulting  in  the  criminal  trial  which  took  place  in Edinburgh  during   
the  September  of  1915.  
 
The  focus  of  this  research  project,  whilst  not  exhaustive  as  to  encompass  the  whole   
wartime  period,  is  to  examine  the  role  played  by  Britain’s  railways  to  Britain’s  war   
effort,  particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  to  detail  the  pressures  that  the  rail   
network  faced  during  wartime,  and  how  these  challenges  were  met  in  order  to  fulfil  the   
demands  being  placed.  As  a  method  of  conducting  this  examination,  the  events  of  the   
Quintinshill  rail  disaster  shall  be  examined,  focusing  on  how  each  of  the  pressures   
present  on  the  rail  network,  including  pressures  on  rolling  stock;  pressures  on   
infrastructure;  and  pressures  on  railway  personnel  operating  the  network,  all  came  
together  and  helped  to  cause  Britain’s  worst  rail  disaster.  To  assist  with  the  undertaking  
of  this  research  project  a  number  of  different  documents  have  been  consulted.  These  
range  from  the  official  report  into  the  disaster  that  happened  at  Quintinshill  written  by  
Lieutenant  Colonel  Edmund  Druitt  in  the  weeks  following  the  disaster,  a  document  that   
had  been  made  available  via  the  internet  as  a  PDF  document  accessed  through  the   
website  Parlipapers.co.uk  and  through  documents  relating  to  the  operations  of  the   
Railway Executive  Committee  which  are  stored  at  the  National  Archive  at  Kew  in  London.   
Some  newspaper  reports  of  the  disaster  have  also  been  utilized  to  help  provide  an   
indication as  to  the  public  reaction  to  the  events,  and  each  of  these  documents  all  have   
a  role  to  play  in  the  undertaking  of  this  research  project.   
 
It  is  however  first  important  to  acknowledge  what  has  been  written  beforehand,  and  it   
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Literature  Review 
“The  Forgotten  Aspect  of  Britain’s  First  World  War?” 
 
Whilst  conducting  this  study,  a  number  of  secondary  literature  sources  will  be  utilized  to   
add  to  the  general  picture  surrounding  the  operation  of  Britain’s  railways during  the   
First  World  War,  and  the  sequence  of  events  in  the  early  months  of  1915  which  should   
add  to  the  case  study  of  the  Quintinshill  rail  disaster  that  shall  be  undertaken  in   
chapters  two  and  three.  These  texts  can  be  considered  to  deal  with  one  of  two  issues,   
these  being  wider  First  World  War  literature  and  literature  referring  to  the  history  of   
Britain’s  railways.   Although  limited  in  their  usage  towards  completely  detailing  the  role   
of  Britain’s  railways  during  the  First  World  War,  general  texts  on  the British  experience   
do  help  provide  a  gateway  into  the  wider  context  of  Britain’s  First  World  War,  and  this   
backdrop  is  crucial  to  completing  an  understanding  of  the  railways  and  the  role  they   
played.  In  order  for  a  more  complete  analysis  to  be  achieved  it  is  first  important  to   
identify  each  of  the  key  themes  running  throughout  the  operation  of  Britain’s  railways   
during  this  period  of  time,  and   to  examine  each  of  the  key  texts  that  have  helped  form   
the  background  information.  To  do  this,  the  two  categories  of  texts,  these  being  railway   
specific  literature  and  First  World  War  literature,  will  be  handled  separately  so  as  to   
allow  for  deeper  analysis  of  each  of  these  categories  to  be  achieved.  Perhaps  the  logical   
area  in  which  to  start  this  analysis  of  secondary  literature  is  in  with  the  general  First   
World  War  literature,  and  how  these  texts  help  to  contribute  towards  the  backdrop  in   
which  a  study  of  the  railways  is  to  be  conducted.  
   
What  becomes  apparent  from  some  of  the  secondary  literature,  particularly  those  with  a   
longer  period  of  focus,  is  that war  period  is  referred  to  simply  as  a  paragraph1  of   
 
1 Hugh Kearney, The British Isles: A History of Four Nations (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989) pg. 195 
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information  contained  in  a  longer  chapter  on  the  twentieth  century  as  a  whole,  whilst   
others  make  reference  to  the  First  World  War  as  a  passing  mention  to  wider  subjects,   
such  as  the  history  of  British  trade  unionism.2   
 
Trade  unionism,  although  not  prioritized  as  a  focus  within  this  research  project,  is   
perhaps  the  first  of  the  major  themes  which  have  been  explored  by  authors  examining   
the  war  period,  and  this  can  be  seen  to  link  in  with  two  types  of  focus  that  has  taken   
place  in  scholarly  works,  this  being  political  focus  and  focus  on  workers.  Whilst  these   
texts  are  by  nature  very limited  in  their  usage  in  a  study  devoted  to  the  First  World   
War,  they  do  help  to  signify  the  differences  in  focus  that  can  be  presented  between   
different  authors  writing  about  similar  subject  areas.  Other  authors  examining  the  issue   
of  British  trade  unionism  have  gone  slightly  further  in  elaborating  the  role  of  the  trade   
unions  during  the  course  of  the  conflict,  stating  that  due  to  the  war,  trade  unions   
gained  political  recognition  in  areas  they  hadn’t  before3,  before  then  detailing  the   
actions  of  some  shop  stewards  in  calling  strike  action  during  the  war  against  the  wishes   
of  the  union  leaders  and  their  agreement  with  the  Government  to  not  strike  for  the   
course  of  the  war.4  The  main  element  to extract  from  this  extended  information  on  the   
role  of  trade  unions  during  the  war  is  that  unions  began  to  be  recognized  on  a  political   
level,  something  which  would  have  applied  to  the  two  railway  specific  trade  unions,   
however  there  is  no  specific  mention  of  either  contained  within  this  extended  text.  
 
One  particular  trend  that  has  been  noted  in  the  First  World  War  specific  literature  is   
the  tendency  of  authors  to  examine  one  particular  theme  of  the  war.  As  the  war   
 
2 Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism: Fifth Edition (Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) e-book, 
accessed: 16/12/2018; Rosemary Aris, Trade Unions and the Management of Industrial Conflict (Basingstoke; 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998) pg. 99 
3 Fraser W. Hamish, History of British Trade Unionism, 1700-1988 (Basingstoke; Macmillan Press Ltd.., 1999) pg. 128 
4 Hamish, pg. 129 
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became  more  prolonged  and  the  British  focus  became  established  on  total  war  these   
specific  trends  become  slightly  blurred,  as  per  the  course  of  a  state  with  the  primary   
focus  being  to  win  the  war.  For  ease  of  analysis  however,  these  trends  will  be   
separated  out  so  as  to  provide  a  more  rounded  framework  in  which  to  investigate  each   
trend.   
 
The  first  of  these  themes  is  the  political  dimension  of  the  war,  and  the  significance  of   
the  British  political  dimension  upon  the  wider  elements  of  the  conflict.  The  initial  focus   
of  the  British  government  can  be  observed  as  attempting  to  maintain  the  premise  of   
‘business  as  usual’  as  much  as  possible,  as  exemplified  by  the  subcontracting  of   
munitions  contracts  from  the  government  to  private  companies.  This  approach  however   
was  unsustainable,  and  resulted  in  what  became  known  as  the  ‘shell  crisis’.  The  shell   
crisis  will  prove  significant  to  chapters  two  and  three,  due  to  the  timing  of  the  event,   
occurring  as  the  backdrop  to  the  Quintinshill  disaster,  and  the  implications  and   
consequences  that  arose  out  of  this  shortage  in  the  nations  munitions  to  the  rest  of  the   
British  war  effort.  It  is  noted  by  several  authors  examining  the  political  dimension  of  the   
war,  particularly  in  the  early  period  of  the  conflict,  that  the  shell  crisis  was  the  result  of   
a  lack  of  planning  and  slow  reactions  on  the  behalf  of  the  British  government.5  In   
addition  to  this,  focus  has  been  drawn  to  the  idea  of  internal  division  within  the   
government  also  being  both  a  contributing  factor  behind  the  shell  crisis,  as  well  as  the   
first  coalition  government  led  by  Asquith  in   May  1915,  and  the  later  formation  of  the   
Liberal/Conservative  coalition  government  in  December  19166  following  Asquith’s   
resignation.  A  continuation  of  this  line  of  argument  that  has  been  explored  is  the   
 
5 Ian Cawood and David McKinnon-Bell, The First World War (Oxon; Routledge, 2014) e-book, accessed: 28/08/2019 
pp. 42-43  
6 Cawood and McKinnon-Bell, pp. 42-43; John Turner, British Politics And The Great War: Coalition and Conflict 
1915-1918 (London; Yale University Press, 1992) pp. 56-61  
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significance  that  the  shell  crisis  and  the  establishment  of  the  first  coalition  government   
had  on  the  state  of  the  British  political  war  machine.  To  support  this  line  of  thinking,  it   
has  been  asserted  that  the  split  of  the  government  and  the  establishment  of  the  civilian   
led  Ministry  of  Munitions7  are  interlinked,  with  David  Lloyd  George,  the  former   
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  being  appointed  at  the  head  of  the  Ministry.8   
 
However,  something  that  becomes  clear  from  some  authors,  most  notably  Alan  G.V.   
Simmonds,  is  the  apparent  lack  of  communication  between  the  different  departments  of   
the  British  war  machine.  Simmonds  argues  that  due  to  manpower  shortages,  one  of  a   
handful  of  subject  areas  in  which  there  is  an  overlap  with  themes  which  shall  be   
covered  in  the  examination  of  operations  on  the  railways,  Lloyd-George  had  to  approach   
the  Army  High  Command  for  the  release  of  some  new  recruits  so  as  to  send  them  back   
to  work  in  the  munitions  factories  on  the  home  front  and  help  to  maintain  supplies. 9   
However,  Ian  Cawood  and  David  McKinnon-Bell  have  pointed  out  that  the  resupply  of   
the  British  armed  forces  was  something  of  a  slow  process,  pointing  out  that  despite  the   
passage  of  the  ‘Munitions  of  War  Act’  which  became  law  in  July  1915,  something  that   
allowed  the  government  to  both  award  munitions  contracts  to  private  firms  as  had  been   
the  practice  before  the  establishment  of  the  ministry,  as  well  as  set  up  its  own  state   
owned  munitions  factories  in  attempts  to  keep  up  with  demands,  ministry  produced  war   
equipment  did  not  come  into  active  use  and  availability  until  October  1915,  and  only  in   
significant  quantities  in  the  spring  of  1916.10  What  becomes  clear  is  that  despite  the   
lack  of  communication  between  government  branches  in  the  beginning  stages  of  the   
war,  the  shell  crisis  helped  to  exemplify  the  importance  of  a  government  which  worked   
 
7 David French, “‘A One-Man Show?’ Civil Military Regulations in Britain during the First World War” in Paul Smith 
(ed.) Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856-1990 (London; The Hambledon Press, 1996) pg. 92  
8 Cawood and McKinnon-Bell, pp. 42-32  
9 Alan G.V. Simmonds, Britain and World War One (Oxon; Routledge, 2012) pg. 56 
10 Cawood and McKinnon-Bell, pp. 42-43 
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together  rather  than  as  different  entities  focusing  on  one  area  of  policy.  This  line  of   
thinking  can  be  extended  to  the  formation  of  the  coalition  as  the  importance  of   
cooperation  between  different  individuals  became  key  to  the  ideas  of  total  war,  leading   
to  a  truce  between  the  political  parties  as  it  was  accepted  that  broadly  they  were  all   
working  towards  the  same  thing.  
 
Additionally,  with  regard  to  the  political  dimension  of  the  war,  some  authors  have  taken   
a  different  approach,  in  that  they  have  not  placed  the  First  World  War  as  an  isolated   
period  of  time,  instead  using  the  First  World  War  period  in  conjunction  with  the  pre- 
war  period  of  political  unrest.  Of  particular  note  is  Kenneth  O.  Morgan,  who  in  his   
chapter  detailing  the  twentieth  century,  states  that  “After  the  initial  disasters […] the   
nation  and  its  leaders  settled  down  for  a  long  war.  Vital  domestic  issues  such  as  Irish   
home  rule  were  suspended  for  the  duration  of  the  hostilities.  The  political  parties   
declared  an  indefinite  truce”.11   
 
Additionally  in  texts  referring  to  the  economic  theme  of  First  World  War  study,  there  is   
some  mention  as  to  the  activities  of  the  government  in  handling  big  aspects  of  the   
British  economy,  and  this  is  of  significance  to  the  study  of  the  railways  during  the  First   
World  War.  Peter  Dewey  makes  reference  to  the  government’s  interventions  in  wartime   
critical  industries,  actually  citing  the  railways  as  an  example  to  help  demonstrate  his   
point,  stating  that  “In  spite  of  the  general  predisposition  of  the  government  to  leave   
private  enterprise  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  war  economy,  there  were  some  early   
official  interventions.  The  most  notable  was  the  government’s  assumption  of  control  of   
the  railways  (although  companies  were  not  nationalized)  the  day  after  the  war  was   
 
11 Kenneth O. Morgan, “The Twentieth Century (1914-1991): The First World War” in Kenneth O. Morgan (ed.), The 
OXFORD History of Britain (Oxford; The Oxford University Press, 1993) pg. 583 
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declared.  In  exchange  for  carrying   troops  and  supplies  free  of  charge,  the  companies   
were  guaranteed  their  income  of  1913  (a  good  year).”12  Although  this  information  will   
prove  useful  to  the  study  of  the  railways,  this  is  only  a  passing  reference  to  the   
railways  in  a  larger  text  referring  to  Britain  during  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth   
century  and  as  such  is,  by  its  very  nature,  limited  in  scope,  meaning  that  the  extent  in   
which  this  information  will  prove  useful  may  be  somewhat  limited.   
 
However,  despite  the  problems  being  faced  by  the  government  throughout  the  course  of   
the  war,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  government’s  mobilization  was  such  to  maintain   
public  morale  and  support  for  the  war  effort.  Jon  Lawrence  has  argued  that  because  the   
British  government  was  not  attempting  to  lower  the  pre-war  domestic  living  standards   
for  the  civilian  population,  although  it  was  recognized  as  being  impossible  to  maintain   
everything  for  the  duration  due  in  part  to  high  inflation  on  products  for  the  civilian   
population,  support  for  the  war  was  actually  maintained  throughout  some  of  the  most   
difficult  events  of  the  war,  citing  the  difficult  period  of  1917  and  the  short  lived  German   
breakthrough  in  the  spring  of  1918  as  examples  of  this  maintained  support.13  The   
interesting  note  to  take  from  this  comes  from  the  environment  of  bad  periods  during   
the  war  in  which  morale  was  maintained,  something  that  will  prove  a  key  factor  in  the   
aftermath  of  the  Quintinshill  disaster.  This  is  additionally  linked  to  texts  and  authors   
who  prioritize  reference  to  the  mental  torment  the  war  presented  on  the  people  that   
fought  it,  which  helps  combine  with  other  works  examining  the  medical  impact  of  the   
war  on  both  the  armed  forces  and  the  civilian  population.14 
 
 
12 Peter Dewey, War and Progress: Britain 1914-1945 (Oxon; Routledge, 1997) e-book, accessed: 22/10/2018 pg. 26 
13 Jon Lawrence, “The First World War and its Aftermath” in Paul Johnson (ed.), 20th Century Britain: Economic, 
Social and Cultural Change (Harlow; Longman Group Limited, 1994) pp. 157-157 
14 J.M. Winter, The Great War And The British People (London; Macmillan Education Ltd, 1987) 
15 | P a g e  
 
The  economic  aspect  of  study  of  the  First  World  War  is  the  next  major  prism  in  which   
authors  have  studied  the  period.  Most  notable  in  the  economic  strand  of  study  is  David   
Stevenson,  whose  book  helps  to  provide  some  statistics  for  the  period  as  a  whole,   
particularly  statistics  relating  to  the  amount  of  Gross  National  Produce  to  which  was  
being  devoted  to  the  war  effort  in  the  form  of  shells  for  each  year  of  the  war.15  Whilst   
such  statistics  are  not  entirely  relevant  to  the  matter  at  hand,  they  do  help  to  provide   
an  indication  as  to  the  nature  of  industrial  produce  during  the  war,  something  that  is  a   
side  note,  and  perhaps  the  closest  parallel  to  the  subject  of  the  railways  that  is  possible   
to  derive  from  this  period  of  time.  As  railway  workshops  were  turned  over  to  the   
production  of  heavy  artillery,  and  particularly  tanks  following  their  introduction  in  1916,   
the  figures  as  to  total  production  help  to  provide  a  sense  as  to  exactly  the  types  of   
pressures  that  industry  was  under.  Indeed,  there  have  been  authors  who  have  devoted   
their  works  exclusively  to  the  examination  of  industry  during  the  First  World  War.  Most   
notable  amongst  these  is  Anthony  Burton  and  his  book  examining  the  workers  of  the   
First  World  War.16  In  addition  to  devoting  a  chapter  to  the  subject  of  the  railways   
during  the  First  World  War,  detailing  a  general  picture  of  the  state  the  railways  found   
themselves  in  for  the  duration  of  the  hostilities,  Burton  provides  a  dedicated  chapter  to   
each  of  the  major  aspects  of  British  industry  during  the  war  period,  such  as  the   
production  of  munitions  as  well  as  the  building  of  ships.  
 
However,  what  is  also  apparent  from  some  texts  investigating  the  issue  of  economics  is   
the  seeming  fragility  of  the  British  economy  to  deal  with  the  costs  associated  with  the   
war  effort.  Morgan  makes  reference  to  an  almost  collapse  of  the  British  currency  and   
credit  in  the  initial  weeks  after  the  war,  and  that  this  was  only  prevented  by  “dramatic   
 
15 David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of The First World War (London; Penguin Books Ltd., 2012)  
16 Anthony Burton, The Workers’ War: British Industry and the First World War (Stroud; The History Press, 2014) e-
book, accessed: 20/11/2018 
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measures  by  the  Treasury  and  the  Bank  of  England”.17 
 
Other  historians  have  approached  the  First  World  War  using  the  theme  of  social   
conditions  during  the  period.  Most  prominent  of  these  social  historians  is  Arthur   
Marwick,  who  has  written  numerous  books  covering  the  period.  For  the  purposes  of  this   
research  project,  two  of  these  texts  were  consulted.  The  first  of  these  texts  was  a   
broader  examination  of  the  social  standards  within  twentieth  century  in  Britain,  ranging   
from  1914  to  1970.  The  principle  argument  running  throughout  the   text  is  one  of   
gradual  improvements  in  social  conditions  throughout  the  century,  all  of  which  appear  to   
emanate  from  the  experience  of  the  First  World  War  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.18   
Included  in  this  is  some  reference  to  the  changing  role  of  women  within  Britain,  a   
factor  that  this  research  project  is  not  focusing  on  in  their  roles  on  the  railways,  but  is   
important  to  acknowledge  within  the  wider  sphere  of  the  First  World  War  on  the   
railways.  Additionally,  Marwick  also  makes  some  mention  of  the  situation  in  Ireland  and   
the  state  of  Irish  politics  which,  although  interesting  when  investigated  separately,  has   
little  use  when  examining  the  railways  of  the  home  front  within  Britain.   
 
The  second  book  written  by  Marwick  that  has  been  used  is  far  more  specific  in   
assessing  the  period  of  the  First  World  War.  Contained  within  this  text  is  several   
different  stands  of  focus  contained  within  the  First  World  War.  These  strands  include   
such  themes  as  the  public  support  for  the  war;  the  role  of  labour  during  the  war;  the   
role  of  women  during  the  war  and  the  role  of  science  and  technology  to  the  course  of   
the  hostilities.19  Of  these  themes,  perhaps  the  only  one  which  can  be  considered  to   
 
17 O. Morgan, “The Twentieth Century” pg. 583 
18 Arthur Marwick, The Explosion of British Society 1914-1970 (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1971) pp. 5-32 
19 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge (Second Edition) (London; Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991) 
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have  any  influence  on  the  situation  on  the  railways  is  the  role  of  labour  during  the  war,   
with  the  rest  of  Marwick’s  focus  being  related  to  elements  of  the  war  that  are  unlinked   
to  the  railways,  although  Marwick  does  make  a small  amount  of  references  to  the   
political  situation  of  the  railways,  particularly  in  the  early  period  of  the  war.  The   
reasoning  behind  the  role  of  labour  being  useful  to  the  successful  conduction  of   
research  into  the  operations  on  Britain’s  railways  during  the  First  World  War  is  the  state   
of  the  labour  situation  on  the  railways  following  the  initial  call  up.  The  railway  is  and   
was  by  default  an  industry  that  required  large  amounts  of  workers  to  ensure  the   
successful,  and  more  importantly  safe  operation,  and  as  the  call  up  saw  large  amounts   
of  railway  workers  leaving  the  domestic  railways  to  fight  in  the  forces,  the  staff  that   
were  left  became  ever  more  overworked  as  the  pressures  of  the  railways  continued  to   
mount.  
 
Additionally,  other  authors  have  followed  down  this  theme  of  investigating  social   
standards  during  the  First  World  War,  however  this  has  broadly  been  a  solitary   
paragraph  contained  in  a  longer  narrative  surrounding  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth   
century  in  Britain  focusing  mainly  on  the  question  as  to  how  much  impact  did  the  war   
have  on  Britain’s  social  standards,  or  were  the  changes  that  were  to  come  later  in  the   
twentieth  century  merely  something  that  were  accelerated,  rather  than  caused  by   
Britain’s  involvement  in  the  war.20 
 
Interestingly,  the  literature  specifically  focusing  on  the  railways  of  Britain  tend  to  have   
limited  mentions  of  the  First  World  War  period,  citing  the  period  of  the  First  World  War   
as  either   a  solitary  chapter  in  the  longer  story  of  British  railway  history,  or  to  simply   
 
20 John Stevenson, The Penguin Social History of Britain: British Society 1914-45 (London; Penguin Books, 1984) pg. 
78 
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gloss  over  the  whole  aspect  of  operations  on  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War   
entirely.  Multiple  texts  seem  to  agree  on  the  immediate  background  to  the  events21  of   
the  war,  and  whilst  this  is  useful  in  providing  a sense  of  the  backdrop  against  which  the    
railways  were  operating,  this  does  not  help  to  provide  any  information  as  to  operations   
on  the  railways  for  the  duration  of  the  war.  Additionally  there  is  limited  mention  of  the   
formation  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee  within  wider  secondary  literature  handling   
the  subject  of  Britain’s  railway  history.  However,  what  has  been  written  will  prove   
extremely  useful  in  helping  to  chart  the  crucial  part  Britain’s  railways  played  during  the   
First  World  War.  David  Ross,  asserts  that  the  government  had  imposed  on  the  railways   
the  task  of  conveying  troops  in  the  case  of  national  emergency  in  184222,  and  that  this   
was  expanded  in  1855  during  the  Crimean  War  when  the  railways  had  been  identified   
and  recognized  by  those  in  authority  as  being  of  strategic  importance  as  a  means  of  
transportation  for  supplies  to  and  from  the  forces.23  In  1865  a  War  Railway  Council  was   
established24,  from  then  on  expanded  under  the  1871 Regulation  of  the  Forces  Act,   
which  allowed  provisions  for  the  creation  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee25  (REC)   
which  officially  formed  in  1912  to  coordinated  operations   on  the  railways  during  a  time   
of  national  emergency,  such  as  a  war26.  This  information  will  prove  useful  due  to  the   
factors  of  dates,  in  that  the  government  can  be  seen  to  be  recognizing  the  railways  to   
be  of  strategic  importance  from  quite  an  early  date  in  the  development  of  the  transport   
network.   
 
21 Adrian Gray, Crime on the Line (Penryn; Atlantic Publishers, 2000); Simon Bradley, The Railways: Nation, Network 
& People (London; Profile Books Ltd., 2016) pg. 397 
22 David Ross, The Illustrated History of British Steam Railways: The Legacy of the Steam Locomotive (Chester; Amber 
Books Ltd., 2004) pp. 259-260 
23 Christian Wolmer, Fire & Steam: How the Railways Transformed Britain (London; Atlantic Books, 2008) pg. 206 
24 Ross, pp. 259-260 
25 Philip S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 1770-1985 (London; Routledge, 1988) e-book, accessed: 24/10/2018 
pp. 224-225 
26 Jon Mountford, Tom Dodds, Tony Evans & David Adams, British Steam Engines: The Ultimate Guide To The 
Greatest Steam Engines (Sywell; Igloo Books Ltd., 2010) pp. 146-147; Ross pp. 259-260 
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Of  the  authors  who  have  written  on  the  subject  of  the  railways  during  the  First  World   
War,  it  is  clear  that  the  initial  period  of  the  mobilization,  especially  the  initial  effort   
involved  in  getting  the  troops  and  supplies  to  ports  such  as  Southampton  and   
Portsmouth  for  embarkation  to  the  continental  theatre  of  war,  has  formed  part  their   
primary  focus  when  discussing  operations  on  the  railways,  and  how  the  operation  was   
undertaken.27  Whilst  this  detail  on  the  initial  mobilization  effort  will  prove  useful,   
particularly  when  evaluating  the  role  of  the  REC  in  the  early  period  of  the  war,  this   
focus  fails  to  maintain  focus  on  the  railways  within  Britain,  instead  investigating  the   
scene  faced  by  troops  on  the  continent.  
 
Over  pressure  on  the  railways  is  something  that  has  had  minor  coverage  within  railway   
specific  literature,  and  of  this  it  appears  to  be  focused  towards  the  overpressure  on   
staff  rather  than  overpressure  on  infrastructure  and  rolling  stock,  although  it  is   
important  to  note  that  there  have  been  a  handful  of  texts  written  on  the  subject  of   
overpressure  on  infrastructure  and  rail  vehicles,  and  these  will  prove  useful  in   
conducting  the  Quintinshill  case  study  during  chapters  two  and  three.   
 
In  addition,  there  has  also  been  limited  coverage  of  the  role  of  the  railways  as  a  means   
of  transportation  for  the  wounded  heading  to hospitals  across  the  country,  and  as  a   
means  of  transporting  letters  to  and  from  the soldiers  at  the  front.  Only  a   handful  of   
texts  have  pointed  out  that  it  was  soon  realized  that  the  rail  companies  would  need  to   
convert  some  older  stock  to  accommodate  becoming  the  first  hospital  trains,  before   
beginning  a  program  of  building  specifically  designed  vehicles  to  act  as  hospital  trains.28   
 
27 Colin G. Maggs, Great Britain’s Railways: A New History (Stroud; Amberley Publishing, 2018) pp. 260-263; Michael 
Foley, Britain’s Railway Disasters: Fatal Accidents From The 1830s To The Present Day (Barnsley; Pen and Sword 
Books Ltd., 2013) pg. 6; Mountford, Dodd, Evans & Adams, pp. 146-147; Ross, pg. 117; Stuart Hylton, What The 
Railways Did For Us: The Making of Modern Britain (Stroud; Amberley Publishing, 2015) pp. 117-119 
28 Mountford, Dodds, Evans & Adams, pp. 145-147; Wolmer, pp. 210-211 
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Additionally,  the  role  of  postal  conveyance  on  the railways  is  another  area  that  has   
been  somewhat  overlooked,  although  it  is  important  to  mention  that  little  bits  of   
information  have  been  covered.29  Domestic  transportation  for  the  duration  of  the  war  is   
something  else  that  has  had  brief  coverage,  and  domestic  movements  by  rail  is   
something  that  shall  need  to  be  explored  in  further  detail  when  examining  the  role  of   
the  REC.  Most  specific  of  these  domestic  movements  by  rail  is  the  movement  of  coal   
from  South  Wales  to  the  base  of  the  Grand  Fleet  at  Scapa  Flow,  and  this  is  something   
that  has  not  had  sufficient  coverage  to  formulate  a  complete  argument  about.  The   
coverage  that  has  been  completed30  however  will  prove  helpful  not  only  to  the   
operations  of  the  REC,  but  also  to  the  Quintinshill  case  study,  and  allow  for  a  more   
rounded  image  of  these  train  movements  to  be  formed.  This  will  tie  into  some  works   
examining  specific  railway  companies,  in  this  instance  the  Highland  Railway,   and  their   
own  experience  of  the  war  effort. 
 
The  role  of  women  on  the  railways  is  also  an  area  that  has  witnessed  some  coverage  in   
secondary  literature,  and  although  not  forming  the  primary   focus  of  this  research   
project,  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  this  aspect  of  the  railways  and  their  service   
has  received  limited  coverage  within  secondary  literature31,  although  the  role  of  women   
during  the  conflict  is  far  more  prevalent  in  secondary  texts  investigating  the  munitions   
industry.  Texts  which  do  refer  to  women  on  the  railways  appear  to  have  the  main  focus    
on  the  roles  they  were  allowed  to  perform,  not  being  permitted  to  act  as  driver  and   
firemen  of  locomotives  which  was  considered  a  reserved  occupation  and  remained   
specifically  a  male  role.  
 
 
29 Burton, pp. 18-19 
30 Wolmer, pg. 210 
31 Dewey, pg. 26;  
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There  is  an  argument  contained  in  secondary  literature  that  the  main  reason  the   
railways  were  able  to  cope  with  the increase  in  traffic  was  due  to  their  main  problem   
before  the  war.  The  competition  and  rivalry  between  companies  often  led  to  locations   
being  served  by  more  than  one  railway  company.  This  meant  that  there  was  frequent   
doubling,  and  even  tripling,  of  routes  and  freight  yards,  something  that  in  the  pre-war   
peacetime  was  hugely  wasteful,  but  a  factor that  became  hugely  beneficial  upon  the   
commencement  of  hostilities.  An  example  of  this  pre-war  wasteful  practice  and  an   
example  that  will  prove  useful  to  the  case  study  contained  within  this  research  project   
would  be  the  railway  junction  at  Carlisle.  In  the  years  before  the  war  the  town  had   
been  served  by  seven  different  railway  companies,  operating  nine  freight  yards  across   
the  immediate  area.32  Such  concentration  of  railway activity  in  one  location  before  the   
war  would  have  been  considered  a  wasteful  enterprise,  and  some  such  as  Philip  S.   
Bagwell  have  argued  that  “A  Country  at  war  could  not  afford  such  extravagance”33,   
however  this  over  capacity  would  allow  for  the railways  to  fulfil  their  wartime  role  of   
transportation  for  the  nation  to  a  far  greater  extent.  Bagwell’s  text  is  referring  to  the   
larger  revolution  in  transportation  across  the  country  starting  in  the  1770s,  but  he  does   
help  to  provide  some  key  information  to  a  study  of  the  railways  during  the  First  World   
War,  which  have  usefully  been  framed  in  the  wider  context  of  transportation  needs  in   
general  for  a  country  at  war. 
 
In  addition  to  the  wider  general  texts  dealing  with  the  history  of  Britain’s  railways   
during  the  First  World  War,  there  are  three  books  which  will  be  crucial  to  the   
completion  of  the  Quintinshill  case  study  undertaken  in  chapter  two.  These  texts  do   
however  prioritise  exploration  as  to  culpability  and  responsibility  for  the  events  that   
 
32 Bagwell, pp. 224-225 
33 Bagwell, pp. 224-225 
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unfolded,  rather  than  understanding  the  disaster  in  the  wider  context  of  the  railways  at   
war.  This  being  said,  these  texts  help  to  provide  useful  information  about  the  sequence   
of  events,  and  it  is  in  this  capacity  that  these  texts  shall  be  utilized.  The  first  of  these   
texts  focuses  specifically  upon  the  disaster  itself,  although  frames  exploration  of  the   
events  through  the  prism  of  investigating  any  blame  for  the  disaster  on  the  Caledonian   
Railway  company.34  Although  aimed  at  a  more  general  audience,  this  text  does  however   
contain  incredibly  useful  information  about  the  sequence  of  events,  and  the  criminal  trial   
that  was  to  follow  and  as  such  will  help  to  form  the  backbone  of  the  case  study  for   
which  the  primary  resources  will  then  expand  upon.  This  text  also  follows  the  line  of   
argument  that  the  responsibility  can  not  only  be  laid  at  the  feet  of  the  two  signalmen,   
and  that  some  of  the  blame  must  be  placed  upon  the  Caledonian  Railway  company   
itself.  Whilst  this  is  not  an  argument  that  this  research  project  aims  to  answer,  it  is   
interesting  to  compare  this  line  of  thought  when  compared  with  the  two  remaining   
texts,  which  both  fall  into  the  more  traditional  line  of  thinking  on  the  subject  of   
Quintinshill,  this  being  that  the  signalmen  were  wholly  responsible  for  what  happened.   
 
In  his  chapter  detailing  railway  accidents  during  the  First  World  War,  Michael  Foley   
states  “The  accident  was  caused  by  the  actions  of  two  signalmen, George  Meakin  and   
James  Tinsley”.35  Critical  to  the  use  of  this  text  is  the  mention  of  problems  and  dangers   
of  the  types  of  rolling  stock  used  in  the  train  makeups  that  fateful  morning,  and  this   
will  prove  incredibly  useful  when  conducting  the  case  study  as  problems  with  rolling   
stock  is  one  of  the  major  themes  that  this  project  aims  to  address.  The  final  of  the   
three  crucial  texts  being  used  by  this  project  is  O.S. Nock’s  work  on  the  history  of   
British  railway  disasters.  Nock,  a  widely  accepted  railway  historian  writing  in  the  1950s   
 
34 Jack Richards & Adrian Searle, The Quintinshill Conspiracy: The Shocking True Story Behind Britain’s Worst Rail 
Disaster (Barnsley; Pen & Sword Books Ltd. 2015) 
35 Foley, pg. 157 
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and  1960s,  focuses  a  whole  chapter  to  the  Quintinshill  accident36,  and  examines  a   
number  of  different  themes,  such  as  rolling  stock  provisions  and  the  high  demand  usage   
on  the  railways,  both  of  which  form  key  themes  throughout  the  course  of  this  project,   
and   as  such  this  text  helps  to  provide  the  case  study  in  particular  with  details  in  areas   
in  which  gaps  occur  in  the  primary  sources.  Additionally,  Nock  has  written  a  book   
detailing  the  history  of  the  railways  in  Scotland,  in  which  he  devotes  a  substantial   
section  to  the  disaster  and  the  implications  that  it  had  for  the  railways  in  Scotland.37   
These  texts  will  also  help  to  provide  details  of  other  railways  disasters  happening  at   
around  the  same  time  so  as  to  provide  a  comparative  element  to  the  Quintinshill  case   
study.  
 
One  final  text  that  shall  be  utilized  whilst  undertaking  this  study  focuses  mainly  on  a   
description  of  how  the  brakes  used  that  morning  worked.  Colin  Magg’s  populist  book   
examining  the  correct  procedure  for  operating  steam  locomotives  on  the  railway  contains   
a  section  detailing  exactly  how  the  Westinghouse  system  of  air  braking  operates  on  a   
railway  locomotive,  and  this  description  of  operation  has  proven  crucial  to  gaining  an   
understanding  around  how  such  brakes  work,  so  although  of  no  use  for  detailing  the   
events  and  their  significance,  this  text  does  allow  for  greater  understanding  behind  the   
instrumentation  fitted  to  the  locomotives  involved  in  the  disaster  at  Quintinshill  to  be   
reached.38 
 
To  conclude,  secondary  literature  coverage  of  the  railways  during  the  period  of  the  First   
World  War  has  unfortunately  been  something  of  an  afterthought  within  the  two  main   
 
36 O.S. Nock, Historic Railway Disasters: Fourth Edition [Revised by B.K. Cooper] (Shepperton; Ian Allan Ltd., 1987) 
pp. 88-95 
37 O.S. Nock, Scottish Railways (Edinburgh; Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1950) pp. 182-183 
38 Colin Maggs, “Brakes” in Colin Maggs (ed.), Train Driver’s Manual (Stroud; Amberley Publishing, 2014) pg. 271 
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camps  of  study.  Texts  with  a  focus  on  the  First  World  War  period  tend  to  prioritize   
examinations  of  either  the  political,  the  economic  or  the  social  impact  of  the  conflict  on   
both  the  civilian  population  and  individuals  serving  in  the  military.  Political  and  economic   
focused  texts  do  contain  some  mention  of  the  impact  of  the  war  on  industry  and  these   
help  to  provide  a  framework  for  examining  the  railways  during  the  course  of  the   
conflict,  with  some  providing  limited  information  about  the  state  of  the  railways  during   
the  war,  mainly  from  the  stance  of  the  politics  behind  operations.  Of  the  railway   
specific  literature  there  is  little  coverage  of  the  First  World  War  period  outside  of  a   
general  overview  of  the  task  facing  the  railways  immediately  upon  the  outbreak  of   
hostilities,  and  the  role  of  railway  workers  during  the  course  of  the  war.  Understandably   
given  the  centenary  commemorations  of  the  conflict,  there  has  in  recent  years  been  a   
renewed  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  First  World  War.   However,  operations  on   
Britain’s  railways,  and  the  role  that  they  played  in  the  wider  story  of  Britain’s  First   
World  War  experience  have  been  sadly  overlooked  in  favour  of  exploratory  works   
examining  the  lives  of  the  civilian  population  at  home,  or  rather  the  politics  behind   
maintaining  the  British  war  effort.  More  specific  texts  have  been  written  surrounding   
railway  disasters,  and  as  such  these  texts  invariably  make  mention  of  the  Quintinshill   
disaster  which  will  prove  useful  when  examining  these  events  during  the  completion  of   
the  case  study  contained  in  chapters  two  and  three,  and  help  to  provide  a  sense  of  the   
intensity  in  which  the  railways  were  being  used  during  the  course  of  the  war.  It  is  only   
by  using  all  of  these  small  pieces  of  information  in  conjunction  with  each  other,  as  well   
as  evidence  which  has  remained  contained  within  primary  documents,  that  a  more   
coherent  analysis  of  the  situation  the  railways  were  facing  during  the  First  World  War   
will  be  able  to  be  obtained,  and  by  so  doing,  help  to  bring  coverage  to  a  significant   
piece  of  Britain’s  First  World  War  story  that  has  remained  something  of  an  obscurity.  
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Chapter  One: 
“Britain’s  Railways  During  the  First  World  War  –  The  Role  of  the  Railway 
Executive  Committee” 
 
The  Outbreak  of  War 
Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  August  1914  the  railways  of  Britain  were  taken  into  
Governmental  supervisory  control.  This  was  achieved  through  the  establishment  in  1912   
of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee  (REC),  and  the  remit  of  this  committee  covered   
operations  on  the  entirety  of  the  railway  network  within  Britain.  This  was  not   
nationalisation  along  the same  lines  as  would  occur  in  1948,  but  supervision  of  the  rail   
companies  by  the  government  so  that  all  train  movements  undertaken  during  the   
conflict  could  be  considered  as  working  for  the  good  of  the  national  war  effort.   
Information  taken  from  a  number  of documents  held  in  the  National  Archives  helps  to   
place  the  role  of  the  REC  into  a  specific area  of  First  World  War  study,  whilst  also   
placing  the  operational  aspect  of  the  railways,  often  overlooked  in  the  study  of  the  First   
World  War,  into  the  sphere  of  the  wider war.  Although  the  remit  of  the  REC  has  been   
examined  in  secondary  literature  elsewhere,  this  discussion  of  the  REC  aims  to  be  far   
more  detailed  about  the  operations  of  this  subcommittee  of  the  government,  and  how   
the  incentives  of  the  REC  were  translated  into  operations  on  the  railways  during  the   
beginning  stages  of  the  war.  
 
The  Railway  Executive  Committee 
Over  the  course  of  the  conflict,  the  Committee  itself  met  at  least  once  a  year  to  discuss   
the  operations  that  needed  to  be  undertaken,  and  following  these  meetings  the  minutes   
of  discussions  was  stored  by  the  Committee  so  as  to  allow  them  to  be  referred  too  at   
a  later  date  should  the  necessity  arise.  In  this  there  is  evidence  that  the  Committee   
itself,  acting  on  the  behalf  of  the  government,  was  determined  that  the  pre-war  Liberal   
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disciplines  continued,  in  that  they  were  determined  to  leave  private  business alone.   
 
The  REC  itself  was  formed  of  the  chairmen of  the  largest  rail  companies  in  Britain,  and   
by  March  1919  was  comprised  of  14  individuals39  including  Sir  Arthur  Stanley;  Sir   
Herbert  Walker;  Sir  Alexander  Kaye  Butterworth;  Sir  Sam  Fay;  Sir  William  Forbes;  Sir   
Francis  Dent;  D.  A.  Matheson;  I.  T.  Williams;  C.  H.  Dent;  F.  Tatlow;  A.  Watson;  F.  Potter;   
Major G.  S.  Szlumper  and,  most  notably,  H.  W.  Thornton,  chairman  of  the  Great  Eastern   
Railway  (GER).  Thornton  is  the  most  notable  individual  on  the  committee  at  this  time   
due  to  him  being  an  American  citizen,  and  several  papers  exist  showing  the  great   
displeasure  amongst  railway  chairmen  from  the  other  companies  that  a  non-British   
national  was  being  considered  for  membership  on  the  committee40,  although  letters   
between  Thornton  and  Mr.  Runciman  of  the  Board  of  Trade  confirm  that  Thornton  was   
accepted  onto  the  committee  in  February  1916.41   
 
At  the  start  of  the  war,  the  number  of  railway  companies  in  Britain  totaled  12042,  each   
of  which  operated  its  own  network  stretching  to  destinations  across  the  country.  To   
name  a  few   examples  the  most  obvious  would  be  the  Great  Western  Railway  (GWR)  
working  from  London  to  Plymouth,  the  West  Country  and  South  Wales;  the  London  and   
North  Western Railway  (LNWR),  the  Great  Northern  (GNR)  and  North  Eastern  (NER)   
railways,  and  the  Midland  Railway  (MR)  all  operating  services  northwards  towards   
Scotland.  This  almost  duplication  of  network  had  naturally  led  to  fierce  rivalry  between   
rail  companies  in  the  years  before  the  First  World  War,  as  each  company  competed  for   
 
39 Railway Executive Committee List of Members, 24th March 1919, MT 6/2587/1 (The National Archives) 
40 Private Letter to Llewellyn Smith, 28th February 1914, MT 6/2587/1 (The National Archives)  
41 War Office Letter from B.B Cubitt, 27th December 1915, MT 6/2587/1 (The National Archives); Letter between 
HW. Thornton and Mr. Runciman, 7th February 1916, MT 6/2587/1 (The National Archives)   
42 David Ross, The Illustrated History of British Steam Railways: The Legacy of the Steam Locomotive (Chester; Amber 
Books Ltd., 2004) pg. 117 
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traffic,  however  this  was  to  change  with  the  outbreak  of  war.  
 
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  key  impediments  to  the  rail  network  before  the   
war  was  a  vast  over  capacity  of  rail  lines,  this  being  due  to  several  different  companies   
running  lines  to  the  same  destinations  as  their rivals.43  This  however  became  one  of  the   
main  operational  benefits  to  the  railways  during  the  time  of  war,  and  really  allowed  the   
railways  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  national  war  effort.  This  overcapacity  of  the  peace  time   
era  became  a  fully  utilized  advantage  in  the  wartime  period,  and  this  was  supplemented   
by  the  orders  of  the  REC,  designed  as  they  were  to  increase  available  capacity  on  the   
network. 
 
On  the  4th  of  August  1914  Britain  declared  war  on  Germany.  The  following  day,   
provisions  established  in  Section  16  of  the  1871  Regulation  of  the  Forces  Act44  enabled   
the  government  to  obtain  overarching  control  of  the  railways  of  Britain45,  something  that   
was  confirmed  by  R. Stuart  Wortley,  the  Director  of  Transport  and  Movements  on  the   
REC  in  a  series  of  letters  sent  to  the  directors  of  railway  companies  across  the  nation.46   
This  immediate  governmental  takeover  of  control  over  Britain’s  railways  enabled  the   
initial  mobilization  effort  to  take  place  without  unnecessary  hindrance  from  the  individual   
private  companies,  and  as  such  within  the  first  month  of  the  conflict  mobilization   
through  the  ports  of  Southampton  and  Portsmouth  managed  to  take  place  ahead  of   
time,  the  railway  companies  being  allotted  60  hours  for  the  initial  mobilization  effort  but   
achieving  this  in  only  48  hours,  embarkation  beginning  on  the  9th  of  August  and  the   
 
43 Philip S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 1770-1985” (London; Routledge, 1988) e-book, accessed: 24/10/2018 
pp. 224-225 
44 Letter between the General Manager of the London and South Western Railway and the Board of Trade, 24th 
October 1912, MT 6/2844 (The National Archives) 
45 Jon Mountford, Tom Dodds, Tony Evans & David Adams, British Steam Engines: The Ultimate Guide To The 
Greatest Steam Engines (Sywell; Igloo Books Ltd., 2010) pp. 148-150; Ross, p. 117 
46 R. Stuart Wortley letter on behalf of the War Office, 4th August 1914, MT 6/2844 (The National Archives) 
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first  stage  being  completed  by  the  31st  of  August.47  
 
At  the  same  time  as  this  written  instruction  to  the  directors  of  the  railway  companies,   
the  REC  issued  a  booklet  of  specific  instructions  to  the  operating  departments  of  these   
companies  detailing  the  expected  protocol  for  all  operations  on  the  rail  network.  This  
document,  comprised  of  several  different  instructional  paragraphs,  was  designed  to  act   
as  the  overarching  template  for  operations  on  the  railways,  superseding  the  individual   
models  that each  of  the  companies  had  in  effect  before  the  war.  By  utilizing  this   
document  as  the  template  of  operations,  it  became  possible  for  the  government  to   
coordinate  operations  across  the  different   rail  companies,  and  by  so  doing  ensure  that   
the  war  effort  was  being  put  first.   
 
Contained  within   these  paragraphs  of  operation  is  the  instruction  that  priority  must be   
given  to  military  and  naval  traffic  over  civilian,  and  that  this  must  be  overseen  by  the  
Quartermaster  General  to  the  Forces  stationed  at  the   War  Office.48  In  order  to  allow   
this  change  in  priority  from  express  passenger  traffic  to  wartime  supplies  to  take  place,   
some  of  the  fundamental  accepted  practices  on  the  railways  needed  to  be  changed.  Of   
these  practices,  the  first  that  needed  to  be  adapted  was  the  territorial  nature  in  which   
rolling  stock  was  administrated.  As  soon  as  the  war  was  declared,  every  piece  of  rolling   
stock  that  was  available  and  able  to  be  pressed  into  service  was  to  be  utilized,   
regardless  of  railway  company  of  origin.  It  was  also  this  rolling  stock  share  scheme  that   
meant  that  rolling  stock  which  had  recently  been  earmarked  for  withdrawal  and  
replacement  was  instead  pressed  into  service  supplying  the  national  war  effort.  This   
scheme  stretched  across  both  passenger carrying  vehicles  and  privately-owned  goods   
 
47 Colin G. Maggs, Great Britain’s Railways:  A New History (Stroud; Amberley Publishing, 2018) pp. 260-263 
48 Instructions to the General Managers of Railways in Great Britain as to the Working of Naval and Military Traffic 
on Mobilization, 4th August 1914, MT 6/2844 (The National Archives)  
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wagons,  although  it  stopped  short  of  locomotive stock  which  remained  on  the  railway   
company  of  origin.  This  was  due  in  part  to  slightly  differing  loading  gauges  across  the   
country.  The  loading  gauge  refers  to  the  amount  of  clearance  that  needs  to  be  left  to   
either  side  of  the  trackwork  infrastructure  so  as  to  prevent  any  rail  vehicle  striking  an   
obstacle.  The  most  notable  example  of  this  was  the  GWR  with  its  slightly  broader   
loading  gauge  which  allowed  for  the  building  of  locomotives  with  slightly  larger  cylinders.   
This  was  a  hangover  of  the  conversion  from  the  7ft¼  inch  broad  gauge  to  the  4ft  8½   
inch  standard  gauge  which  took  place  in  the  1890s49,  and  meant  that  locomotives  built   
by  the  GWR  could,  although  able  to  run  elsewhere  in  country  due  to  the  same  wheel   
gauge  being  adopted,  have  been  liable  for  striking  elements  of  railway  infrastructure   
such  as  station  platforms  on  other  companies  networks  wherein  such  a  conversion  had   
not  taken  place  and  the  loading  gauge  was  slightly  tighter.  It  was  this  factor  of  different   
company  rolling  stock  being  spread  across  the  network  that  meant  that  aging  Great   
Central  Railway  (GCR)  passenger carriages  ended  up  in  the  train  makeup  of  the   
Caledonian  Railway  (CR)  troop  train  service  involved  in  the Quintinshill  Rail  Disaster  as   
will  be  explored  in  chapter  two.   
 
Although  the  REC  gave  priority  to  military  traffic,  there  were  instances  wherein  this  
priority  was unable  to  be  fulfilled,  and  this  is  due  in  part  to  the  paperwork  surrounding   
different  consignments  heading  for  the  theatre  of  war.  In  minutes  for  a  REC  Goods   
Managers  meeting  dated  6th  October  1914,  it  is  stated  that  on  the  22nd  of  September   
1914  companies  were  having  trouble  in  identifying  different  consignments  due  to  
inadequate  labelling  on  packages  passing  through  the  docks50,  and  as  such  refusing  to   
take  the  consignments.  This  shows  that,  although  under  the  supervisory  control  of  the   
 
49 Rosa Matheson, The GWR Story (Stroud; The History Press, 2010) pg. 49 
50 Minutes of Special Meeting of Goods Managers, 6th October 1914, RAIL 1080/246 (The National Archives)  
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REC  and  whilst  theoretically  working  towards  the  war effort,  railway  procedures  from  the   
pre-war  private  companies  era  still  needed  to  be  observed.  This  indicates  that,  given  the   
date,  the  full  extent  of  the  requirement  of  the  war  effort  had  not  yet  been  realised.   
Coming  only  a  month  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  prevailing  attitude  would  still   
have  been  one  of  a  short  European  conflict  that  would  be  over  before  Christmas,  and   
so  by  maintaining  the  practice  of  refusing  packages  with  inadequate labelling,  it  can  be   
argued  that  the  private  companies  were  inadvertently  frustrating  the  mobilization,  an   
argument  that  would  again  indicate  that  private  enterprise  was  not  yet  recognizing  the   
need  for  the  country  to  be  on  a  total  war  footing  in  order  to  fight  the  conflict. 
 
The  REC  also  had  the  powers  to  curtail  the  competitive  passenger  traffic  which  before   
the  war  had  been  the  prerogative  of  the  individual  companies.  In  a  private  memo   
detailing  the outcome  of  subcommittee  meetings  of  the  REC  dated  the  4th  of  February   
1915,  the  committee  recommended  that  the  competitive  passenger  trains  of  the  various   
companies  should  be  curtailed  and,  in  some  cases,  withdrawn  as  of  Monday  the  1st  of   
March  1915.51  The reasons  provided  for  this  recommendation  were  threefold,  including  to   
facilitate  and  improve  the  workings  of  goods  and  mineral  trains;  to  economize  on  coal   
used  for  railway  locomotives;  and  to  enable  more  trained  men  to  be  available  for  work   
relief.52  The  timing  of  these  orders,  and  one  of  the  reasons  for  their  existence  proves   
interesting  and  insightful  for  investigating  the  wider  state  of  Britain’s  railways  in  the   
early  months  of  1915,  and  how  this  is  indicative  as  to  the  state  of  Britain  at  that  time.   
The  state  of  the  nation  in  the  early months  of  1915  was  that  of  a  country  in  crisis.  The   
initial  war  effort  of  late  1914  had  placed  the  country  on  a  footing  to  supply  a  war   
effort  until  Christmas  1914,  along  the  line  of  the  general  belief  that  any  conflict  would   
 
51 Curtailment of Competitive Passenger Train Services, 6th February 1915, RAIL 1080/149 (The National Archives)  
52 Curtailment of Competitive Passenger Train Services, 6th February 1915, RAIL 1080/149 (TNA) 
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be  a  rapid  affair  on  the  continent.  When  however  it  became  clear  that  the  war  was   
going  to  prolong  well  into  the  new  year,  the changeover  to  a  total  war  footing  proved   
to  be  slow,  and  as  such  production  of  key  war  materials  such  as  shells  and  munition   
was  also  slow  to  keep  up  with  demand  and  ultimately  led  to  shortages.53  In  addition  to   
this,  the  German  U-Boat  campaign  in  the  North  Atlantic,  wherein  German  submarines   
would  sink  all  merchant  ships  coming  into  British  waters,  was  beginning  to  effect  the   
nation  as  a   whole,  particularly  in  regard  to  food  stocks  coming  from  the  rest  of  the   
empire  as  well  as  the  United  States.    
 
The  U-Boat  campaign  also  proves  significant  with  regard  to  the  coal  situation  of  the   
nation,  and  the  vast  increase  in  coal  traffic  using  the railways.  Before  the  war  coal   
supplies  for  the  Grand  Fleet,  based  at  Scapa  Flow  off  of  the northern  coast  of  Scotland,   
was  shipped  from  the  South  Wales  coal  fields  along  the  coast  as  this  was  considered   
to  be  the  most  direct  and  efficient  method  of  transporting  the  fuel  supply.  When   the   
U-Boats  began  interfering  and  sinking  British  shipping  however,  this  practice  became  too   
risky  to  maintain  for  the  course  of  the  war.54  The  chosen  alternative  was  to  send  coal   
via  the  railways  from  South  Wales  up  the  West  Coast  mainline  via  Carlisle  and  Glasgow   
to  a  point  wherein  the  Highland  Railway  (HR)  could  take  charge  of  the  traffic  for  final  
transportation  to  the  nearest  point  of  disembarkation,  this  being  Scrabster  Harbour  near  
Thurso.  This  placed  much  greater  operational  strain  on  the  railways  of  Britain  as  they  
commenced  the  task  of  transporting  fuel  for  the  naval  fleet  protecting  the  nation  from   
any  potential  invasion,  and  as  such  the  instruction  contained  within  the  memo  that   
 
53 Jack Richards & Adrian Searle, The Quintinshill Conspiracy: The Shocking True Story Behind Britain’s Worst Rail 
Disaster (Barnsley; Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2015) pp. 211-212; Ian Cawood and David McKinnon-Bell, The First 
World War (Oxon; Routledge, 2014) e-book, accessed: 28/08/2019 pp. 42-43; David French, “’A One-Man Show’? 
Civil Military Relations in Britain during the First World War” in Paul Smith (ed.) Government and the Armed Forces in 
Britain 1856-1990 (London; The Hambledon Press, 1996) pg. 92 
54 Mountford, Dodds, Evans & Adams, pp. 146-147 
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competitive traffic  on  the  railways  was  to  cease  so  as  to  free  up  capacity55  can  be  seen   
as  the  REC  attempting  to  ease  the  demands  on  the  railways,  albeit  only  in  a  slight  way.   
 
Perhaps  this  moment  is  opportune  to  mention  the  situation  facing  the  HR  at  this  stage  
in  its  existence,  whilst  also  showing  exactly  how  demanding  this  extra  traffic  was  for  the  
railways  at  large.  The  HR  before  the  war  had  followed  along  similar  lines  to  the  MR,   
this  being  to  operate  short,  light,  frequent  services  along  its  network,  thus  negating  the   
need  for  large  locomotives.  Although  they  had  been  the  first  railway  company  in  Britain   
to  adopt  the  4-6-0  wheel  arrangement  in  1894,  an  arrangement  that  was  to become   
something  of  a  standard  for  mixed  traffic  locomotives  across  Britain  later  in  the century,   
the  company  itself  only  had  32  locomotives  of  this  wheel  arrangement  on  its  books   
during  the  war,  the  rest  of  the  company  stock  being  comprised  of  lighter locomotives  of   
mostly  2-4-0,  4-4-0  and  0-6-0  wheel  arrangements.  Given  the  situation  of  this  railway   
before  the  war,  being  situated  in  a  region  with  less  population  than  some  of  the other   
rail  companies  in  Britain  faced,  it  is  clear  as  to  why  this  small  engine  policy  would  have   
been  adopted  as  passenger  trains  would  not  require  heavy  haulage,  and  goods  traffic  
would  have  also  been  relatively  light.  Additionally,  the  HR  itself  had  been  engineered   
with  lighter  axle  loadings  on  its  principal  structures,  meaning  that  larger locomotives   
were  not  possible  without  considerable  strengthening  of  bridges  and  viaducts.   
 
This  was  the  network  that  the  traffic  for  the  Grand  Fleet  needed  to  navigate,  and  the  
HR  locomotive  fleet  proved  to  not  be  sufficient  in  handling  the  traffic  alone.56  This,   
combined  with  large  amounts  of  locomotive  repairs  being  required  due  to  the  overtaxing   
of  locomotives,  required  the  HR  to  hire  in  some  20  locomotives  from  other  railway  
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companies,  principally  the  North  British  Railway  (NBR),  which  also  operated  similar   
services  in  the same  region.  This  action  appears  to  have  been  undertaken  off  the  back   
of  the  HR  in  collaboration  with  the  NBR,  although  it  is  important  to  note  that  such   
action  would  have  been  easy  to  facilitate  at  a  state  level  and  general  coordination  from   
the  REC  may  have  assisted  with  this  hiring  process,  although  it  is  not  clear  if  this   
happened.  Additionally,  the  desire  to  cut  down  on  coal  used  by  railway  locomotives  can  
also  be  viewed  as  a  way  of  diverting  materials  away  from  the  private  industries  and   
focusing  more  on  the  wartime  industries,  in  this  case  being  to  redirect  coal  to  power   
the  nation’s  navy.  
 
In  addition  to  the  curtailment  and  cancellation  of  competitive  passenger  traffic,  the  REC   
also  had,  and  exercised,  the  authority  to  curtail  the  vehicles  being  used  in  the  makeup   
of  trains.  Contained  within  the  recommendations  detailing  the  withdrawal  of  competitive   
passenger  traffic,  the  REC  also  recommended  the  withdrawal  of  through  carriages  and   
dining  cars  in  all services.57  Through  carriages  were  a  means  of  transporting  people  from   
one  place  to  another, using  a  train  that  was  destined  for  another  location.  An  example   
of  a  through  carriage working  would  be  a  service  for  the  Lyme  Regis  branch  line   
originating  at  London  Waterloo  and  using  an express  train  travelling  to  Exeter.  Upon   
arrival  at  Axminster  the  train  would  split  into  two  portions,  the  first  potion  being  the   
continuing  express  to  Exeter  and  the  second portion  being  the  through  carriages  for  the   
branch  line.  This  was  not  the  only  example  of through  carriage  working  on  the  rail   
network,  but  is  a  useful  example  to  use  to  help  demonstrate  the  practice.  This  practice   
was  halted  presumably  to  allow  for  greater  capacity  to  be  had  on the  rail  network   
through  the  prevention  of  unnecessary  delays  of  services.  The  withdrawal  date  contained   
within  the  recommendations  is  Monday  1st  of  March  1915,  although  it  is noted  on  the   
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same  line  that  some  companies  had  by  this  point  in  the  war  already  withdrawn  through   
carriages  and  dining  cars  from  service58,  and  as  such  the  orders  from  the  REC  appear   
simply  to  bring  the  rest  of  the  nation’s  rail  services  into  a  new  standard  mode  of   
practice.  The  withdrawal  of  dining  cars  can  be  seen  as  a  method  used  by  both  the   
private  rail  companies  and  the  government  of  discouraging  unnecessary  travel  on  the   
railways  by  members  of  the  civilian  population,  and  by  so  doing  increase  the  capacity  to   
allow  military  traffic  to  take  priority,  as  well  as  being  a  tactic  employed  by  the  rail   
companies  to  allow  them  to  cope  with  the  loss  in  the  workforce  that  they  experienced   
within  the  initial  stages  of  the  war  from  August  1914  through  until around  June  1915.   
 
This  loss  of  railway  personnel  is  something  else  that  is  worthy  of  note.  At  the  beginning   
of  the  war  occupation  on  the  railway  had  not  been  considered  an  essential  occupation,   
and  so  people  working  on  the  railways  were  permitted  to  join  the  thousands  of  men   
also  enlisting  for  military  service.59  So  bad  did  the  situation  get  with  the  manpower    
shortages  on  the  railways  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  war  that  government  ministers  had   
to  instruct  Haig  and  the  generals  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  that  they were   
required  to  send  railway  servants  back  to  their  jobs  on  the  railways  at  home  until  
alternative  sources  of  labour  could  be  acquired,  this  coming  in  the  form  of  women  who  
joined  the  ranks  of  railway  workers  in  the  capacity  of  cleaners,  guards  and  station  staff   
from  towards  the  end  of  1915.60  
 
In  addition  to  the  withdrawal  of  specific  types  of  rolling  stock  from  passenger  trains,  the   
REC  also  ordered  the  removal  of  excursion  and  cheap  fare  facilities  from  the  rail   
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network.  One  of  the  recommendations  of  the  REC  dated  12th  of  February  1915  was  that   
the  excursion  traffic,  which  up  until  that  point  had  been  permitted  to  run,  was  to  be   
curtailed  in  the  instances  of  civilian  traffic61,  and  this  can  be  seen  as  another  example   
of  attempting  to  free  up  capacity  on  the  rail  network,  something  which  became  even   
more  critical  to  the  ability  of  the  nation  to  continue  the  fight  in  the  early  months  of   
1915.  The  curtailment  of  cheap  fares  of  travel  is  an  interesting  policy  that  the  REC   
followed  and  can  be  seen  as  a  deterrent  to  members  of the  public  against  travelling.  By   
using  higher  fare  prices,  the  REC  can  be  seen  as  influencing  the  affairs  of  private    
business,  but  using  methods  that  would  have  been  accepted  by  the  private  companies,   
the  REC  using  their  prerogative  as  supervisory  controller  of  the  rail  network  to   
determine  the  terms  at  which  the  private  companies  could  operate.  
 
The  REC  also  took  over  control  of  the  transportation  of  troops  from  their  bases  to  a   
port  of  embarkation  to  the  battlefields,  as  well  as  the  transportation  of  troops  from  the   
ports  to  their  bases  in  cases  of  troops  being  on  leave.  Reference  is  often  made  to  the   
factor  that  soldiers  must  not  be  allowed to  travel  without  tickets62,  perhaps  a  method  of   
the  REC  attempting  to  bridge  any  gap  between  state  supervision  and  the  interests  of   
private  companies,  as  well  as  potentially  being  an  example  of  the  REC  attempting  to   
keep  track  of  the  numbers  of  soldiers  travelling  on  the  rail  network  at  any  one  time,   
thus  ensuring  no  irregularities  in  the  armed  forces.  Reference  is  also  made  to  the   
government  subsidy  provided  to troops  to  enable  them  to  use  rail  tickets.  This  subsidy,   
accessed  through  a  0.1800  army  form,  allowed  soldiers  to  purchase  return  tickets  at  the   
rate  of  a  single  journey  fare,  but  in  the  absence  of  this  form  the  ordinary  full  fare  must   
be  charged.63  Although  the  government  was  subsidizing  the  transportation  of  the  troops   
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through  the  0.1800  forms,  the  factor  that  fares were  still  being  charged  by  the  railway   
companies  shows  that  the  intention  of  the government  was  to  act  only  on  a  supervisory   
basis.  This  can  be  argued  to  be  the  government  attempting  to  keep  private  industry  on   
side  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  as  depriving  the  private  companies  of  some  of  their   
revenue  would  not  have  been  acceptable  to  the  companies  themselves.  These  guidelines   
also  apply  to  the  processes  to  be  undertaken  in  the  event  of  any  soldiers  being  found   
at  stations  or  on  trains  travelling  without  a  ticket.  Should  this  happen,  the  guidelines   
dictate  that  the  soldier  needs  to  be  referred  to  a  Railway Transport  Officer  or  to  the   
local  military  authority  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  necessary  warrant  be  obtained.64  This   
guideline  can  be  seen  to  have  several  different  factors  behind  its  creation,  the  first  of   
which  being  to  ensure  that  all  travelling  troops  are  accounted  for  and  as  such  try  and   
prevent  any  desertions  within  the  ranks  of  the  military.  In  addition  to  this,  one  factor   
behind  these  recommended  processes  can  also  be  seen  to  be  the  government’s desire  to   
work  with  the  private  companies  so  as  to  maintain  the  mobilization  throughout  the  
course  of  the  conflict,  and  so  by  having  these  recommended  processes  contained  within   
the  official  guidelines  the  government  was  allowing  the  railway  companies  to  maintain  a   
version  of  the  pre-war  practice  of  removing  travelers  found  without  tickets.  In  addition   
to  this,  the REC  also  allowed  the  individual  rail  companies  to  maintain  the  practice  of   
refusing  refunds  to travelers  who  had  lost  their  tickets,  regardless  of  whether  these   
travelers  were  civilian  or military.65   
 
Perhaps  an  interesting  regional  difference  with  these  cheap  fares  is  that  adopted  in  
Scotland,  as  well  as  the  measures  present  on  the  London  Brighton  and  South  Coast   
(LBSCR);  the  Great Eastern  (GER);  the  London  and  South  Western  (LSWR)  and  the  South   
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Eastern  and  Chatham  (SECR)  railway companies.  In  records  of  meetings  held  on  the  7th   
of  October  1915,  reference  is  made  to  factors  that  the  railway  companies  operating  in   
the  south  of  the  country  were  using  a  different  system  for  the  issuing  of  tickets  in   
order  to  allow  the  companies  to  cope  with  the high  demand  that  they  were  facing  due   
to  their  strategic  location  and  importance  to  the  war effort,  and  this  appears  to  have   
been  acceptable  to  the  REC,  although  details  as  to  the differences  are  not  contained   
within  these  documents.66  In  Scotland  however,  details  as  to  the differences  are  made,   
albeit  briefly.  Unlike  in  the  rest  of  the  country,  wherein  war  workers could  travel  on   
standard  passenger  trains  to  their  places  of  work  and  have  their  tickets subsidized  by   
the  government,  this  appears  to  not  have  been  the  case  for  the  Scottish companies,  who   
only  acknowledge  the  cheap  fare  scheme  on  trains  that  were  considered  to be  ‘workers   
specials’.67  In  other  words,  the  Scottish  rail  companies  were  only  prepared  to charge  the   
lower  rate  of  travel  for  munition  workers  on  specific  trains.  To  counteract  this,  the   
minutes  detail  that  the  Scottish  companies  had  opened  up  large  amounts  of  trains  to  
fulfil  this  ‘workers  trains’  purpose,  as  well  as  producing  tickets  at  a  higher  rate  in  bulk,   
and these  appear  to  have  been  purchased  by  the  management  of  munitions  companies   
and  then  issued  to  the  workforce,  these  tickets  being  valid  on  all  trains.  This  helps  to   
symbolize  the  huge  regional  differences  facing  the  REC  and  its  operation,  and  the   
pressures  that  a  national  board  had  trying  to  coordinate  private  industries  and  private   
interests.  Although  working towards  the  war  effort  was  considered  a  necessity,  it  appears   
that  across  the  nation  this  overarching  goal  was  interpreted  in  different  ways,  and   
without  appearing  to  the  private companies  as  attempting  to  nationalize  the  network,   
the  REC  and  the  government  had  to operate  with  the  systems  in  place  on  the  private   
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networks  throughout  the  war.   
 
Movements  by  Rail 
Important  to  note  is  the  sheer  amount  of  people  and  goods  traffic  moving  on the   
railways  during  this  period.  On  the  GWR  alone  it  is  estimated  that  376,787  military   
personnel;  33,101  horses;  355  guns  and  limbers;  264  ammunitions  wagons;  2,034   
bicycles  and  804  two  wheeled  wagons  were  transported,  all  on  846  special  trains  
dedicated  to  the  war  effort  in  the  first  four  weeks  alone.68  These  numbers  help  to   
demonstrate  exactly  how  critical  to  the war  effort  the  railways  became  almost   
instantaneously,  and  that  without  the  railways,  the  mobilization  effort  would  have  taken   
considerably  longer  to  implement. 
 
In  addition  to  the  conveyance  of  passenger  traffic  on  the  railways,  the  REC  also  had  
jurisdiction  over  the  conveyance  of  goods  and  materials  that  were  to  be  used  in  both   
the  war  effort  and  the  civilian  population.  The  first  example  of  the  committee  exercising   
authority  over  the  non-military  goods  carried  on  the  railways  can  be  seen  as  a  side  note  
contained  within  the  document  recommending  the  withdrawal  of  competitive  passenger  
traffic,  as  well  as  through  carriages  and  dining  cars.  Contained  within  this  document  is  a  
section  relating  to  fish  traffic  between  Scotland  and  England.  In  the  pre-war  period,  fish  
traffic  from  Scotland  to  England  travelled  on  both  the  West  Coast  mainline  and  the  East  
Coast  mainline,  travelling  under  the  authority  of  both  the  CR  and  the  NBR.   The   
recommendations  are  that  each  route  continue  serving  as  routes  for  fish  traffic  but  that   
this  should  be  staggered  month  by  month.69  This  arrangement  would  mean  that  all  fish   
traffic  would  be  concentrated  upon  one  route  for  a  period  of  a  month  before the   
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competing  route  would  take  up  that  traffic  the  following  month.  This  focus  of  traffic  
would  allow  for  capacity  to  be  freed  upon  on  the  alternate  route,  which  in  the  case  of   
the  recommendations  that  the  East  Coast  route  should  begin  this  arrangement   
commencing  on  the  1st  of  March  1915  would  allow  for  the  West  Coast  route  to  have   
some  capacity  freed  up,  something  that  was  greatly  needed  on  the  West  Coast  route   
for  the  first  few  months  of  1915  as  shall  be  discussed  in  chapter  two  with  the   
significance  that  overuse  on  the  West  Coast route  had  on  the  events  that  occurred  at   
Quintinshill.   
 
The  REC  also  commissioned  the  railway companies  in  the  conveyance  of  food  items  for   
the  forces  on  the  front  lines.  These  consignments  were  principally  meat  and  jams,   
although  other  food  items  were  included.  Here  however,  the  REC  shows  that  the  respect   
for  the  private  companies  still  existed  in  a  time  of  war.  In  the  orders  detailing  these  
train  movements,  reference  is  only  made  to  specific  rail  companies  being  commissioned   
for  food conveyance.  These  companies  are  the  GCR;  the  GWR  and  the LNWR.70  This   
factor  is  somewhat  unusual  considering  that  the  main  ports on  the  south  coast  of   
England  for  the  embarkation  of  all  military  traffic  was  either  Southampton  or  
Portsmouth,  Portsmouth  being  served  by  the  LBSCR,  whilst Southampton  was  served  by   
this  and  the  LSWR.  Although  any embarkation  from  Plymouth  would  have  been  covered,   
this  port  being  served  by  the  GWR,  the  lack  of  the  two  main  rail  companies  of  the   
south  east  on  this  list  of  companies  selected  for  the  conveyance  of  military  food   
suggests  that  the  REC  was  attempting  to  even  out  the  military  workload  between   
separate  private  companies,  so  as  to  avoid  any  accusations  of  prioritizing  one  company   
over  any  other,  indicating  that  the  REC  was  aware  that  the  cooperation  of  the  private   
rail  companies  was  still  something  in  which  they  needed  to  consider,  despite  the   
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wartime  situation  and  circumstances  at  the  time. 
 
Parcel  transport  on  the  railways  was  also  of  vital  importance  to  the  REC.  Unlike  the   
wider  trend  of  Britain’s  railway  during  the  period  of  the  First  World  War,  wherein   
express  traffic  was  downgraded  in  priority  to  allow  wartime  supplies  to  run  ahead,  the   
mail  trains  retained their  ‘special’  status  and  priority  in  movement,  and  as  such  ran   
much  the  same  as  express passenger  trains  had  done  before  the  war.  To  this  extent,   
although  the  private  companies were  still  permitted  to  charge  for  the  conveyance  of   
mail,  both  letters  and  packages,  the companies  were  not  permitted  to  charge  commission   
as  had  been  the  practice  before  the war,  and  that  all  military  mail  needed  to  be   
conveyed  at  the  same  charge  as  the  civilian equivalent.71  There  are  several  factors   
behind  the  REC’s  decision  to  keep  the  mail  traffic  running  as  a  matter  of  top  priority.   
The  first  of  these  factors  can  be  seen  to  be  the  desire to  keep  the  troops  morale  up,   
and  therefore  ensure  that  they  were  capable  of  fighting  on  the battlefields.  One  of  the   
main  methods  for  which  morale  was  maintained  was  through  the  receiving  and  sending   
of  letters  and  packages  between  the  front  lines  and  their  homes.  In  order  to  allow  this   
objective  to  be  fulfilled,  the  government,  through  use  of  the  REC,  needed  the   
cooperation  of  rail  companies  in  order  to  make  mail  conveyance  on  equivalent  priority   
to  that  of  explosives  and  munition,  also  travelling  to  the  front  lines.  By  fulfilling  this,  the   
government  would  have  been  seen  by  soldiers  on  the  ground  to  be  working  for  the   
good  of  their  morale,  and  as  such  would  have  been  more  inclined  to  keep  fighting   
despite  the  terrible  conditions  that  were  having  to  be  endured.  Another  of  the  reasons   
as  to  why  the  mails  were  run  as  a  matter  of  priority  can  be  traced   back  to  the  desire   
of  the  government  to  use  the  network  as  a  strategic  link  for  the  military.  All  military   
mails  sent  by  rail  needed  to  get  to  recipients  as  a  matter  of  urgency,  and  by  having  the   
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railways  running  mail  trains  as  a  top  priority,  delivery  of  the  mail  could  be  guaranteed   
to  occur  within  a  few  days  of  sending,  and  in  some  cases  the  following  day.  This  meant   
that,  although  the  telephone  and  telegraph  would  be  used  for  urgent  correspondence   
with  the  front  lines,  document  reports  from  the  front  to  the  war  office  and  orders   
travelling  in  the  opposite  direction  were  able  to  be  received  relatively  quickly,  thus   
enabling  the  war  to  be  coordinated  in  a  more  detailed  way.   
 
One  area  of  railway  transportation  that  was  as  equally  dangerous  as  the  transportation   
and  conveyance  of  munitions  was  the  conveyance of  Anhydrous  Ammonia.  This   
substance,  a  highly  corrosive  gas  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the  new  weapons  being   
trialed  on  the  battlefield  and  thus  recognized  as  a  potential  hazard  for  conveyance,   
needed  to  be  transported  by  rail  from  ports  on  the  west  coast  of  Britain,  such  as   
Liverpool  following  import  from  north  America,  to  munitions  factories  across  the  nation,   
an  example  of  which  would  be  the  munitions  factory  at  Gretna.  The  REC  itself  appears   
to  have  recognized  the  danger  in  the  conveyance  of  these  consignments,  and  as  such   
before  the  war  provisions  had  been  made  by  the  Dangerous  Goods  Committee  in   
minute  1542  dated  19th  June  1913.72  These  provisions  included  extra  checks  of  the   
cylinders  containing  ammonia  before  they  were  transported  and  the  rejection  of  any   
cylinders that  did  not  meet  the  standards  required  for  transportation.  This  date  proves   
interesting,  occurring  as  it  does  before  the  commencement  of  hostilities  and  it  must  be   
presumed  that  new  weapons  were  being  envisaged  for  use  in  the  immediate  pre-war   
period,  and  as  such  provisions  for  the  safe  conveyance  of  the  raw  materials  were  being   
established  well  in  advance.  As  well  as  this,  only  firms  that  had  been approved  by  the   
War  Office  were  permitted  an  import  license,  and  it  was  these  firms  alone  that  the   
 
72 Minutes of Special Meeting of Goods Managers, 6th October 1914, RAIL 1080/246 (The National Archive) 
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railway  companies  were  to  deal  with.73  The  strict  nature  behind  regulations  pertaining  to   
the  conveyance  of  this  substance  can  be  seen  as  the  government  being  keen  that  no   
individuals  in  the  supply  chain  of  the  new  weapons  and  the  necessary  materials  used  to   
manufacture  them  were to  be  accidentally  injured,  thus  maintaining  ideals  relevant  in   
the  reporting  of  munitions  factory  accidents,  this  being  that  reports  are  to  contain  as   
little  details  as  possible  so  as  to  not  dampen  public  morale  and  spirit  for  the  war  effort,   
although  it  is  not  explicitly  stated  that  this  policy  should  be  adopted.    
 
Pressures  on  the  railways:  Accidents  other  than  Quintinshill 
Whilst  this  case  study  is  aiming  to  utilize  the  Quintinshill  disaster  to  examine  pressures   
being  faced  on  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War,  it  is  also  important  to  note   
that  the  events  at  Quintinshill  were  not  the  only  examples  of  railway  accidents  occurring   
during  the  course  of  the  conflict,  and  in  particular  during  the  course  of  1915.  It  has   
been  argued  that  1915  was  the  worst  year  for  rail  accidents  for  a  decade74,  and  whilst   
it  is  arguable  that  this  is  due  in  part  to  the  death  toll  emerging  from  Quintinshill,  other   
rail  disasters  occurring  at  around  the  same  time  are  also  indicative  of  the  pressures   
being  faced  by  the  railways.  The  year  of  1915  started  off  with  the  occurrence  of  a  rail   
disaster,  this  being  a  collision  between  two  trains  at  Ilford  station  on  the  GER  on  the  1st   
of  January  1915  with  the  result  being  10  fatalities.  The  cause  of  the  accident  was  found   
to  be  problems  with  the  signaling  of  train  movements,  in  that  a  local  train  originating   
from  Gidea  Park  and  bound  for  Liverpool  Street  was  moving  across  main  lines,  as  was   
regular  practice  at  such  junction  stations,  when  an  express  from  London  heading  for   
Clacton  collided  with  the  local  as  the  crossover  manoeuvre  was  being  undertaken,   
effectively  slicing  the  carriages  of  the  local  train  into  two  separate  portions.  All  of  the   
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fatalities  were  from  the  carriages  of  the  local  train,  which  had  been  full  of  commuters   
travelling  towards  London.75  Whilst  signaling  issues  have  been  attributed  to  the  causing   
of  this  accident,  it  is  important  to  note  that  it  was  believed  that  the  signals  were  set   
for  the  local  train  leaving  Ilford,  and  so  confusion  on  the  behalf  of  the  express  train   
driver  and  a  misreading  of  the  signals  were  also  contributing  factors.  The  Liverpool   
Street  train  usually  followed  the  Clacton  express  in  departure  times  but  on  that   
morning,  the  local  train  was  running  ahead  of  the  Clacton  express76,  and  so  a  lack  of   
knowledge  of  this  factor  on  the  behalf  of  the  express  train  driver  could  have  helped   
contribute.  In  this,  as  with  the  events  that  unfolded  at  Quintinshill  just  five  months   
later,  troops  were  involved  in  the  rescue  efforts,  although  in  this  case  the  soldiers  were   
from  the  territorials  and  had  been  tasked  with  either  guarding  the  line,  or  employed  in   
the  immediate  area  of  the  railway  station.  
 
After  the  events  of  Quintinshill,  the  next  major  rail  accident  to  occur  happened  on  the   
14th  of  August,  when  the  London  Euston  to  Holyhead  express  was  derailed  on  a  section   
of  line  between  Stowe  Tunnel  and  Weedon  station.  Seven  of  the  derailed  carriages   
rolled  down  the  lineside  embankment  and  the  fifth  and  sixth  carriages  in  the  train   
makeup  telescoped,  a  factor  that  led  to  the  majority  of  the  ten  deaths.  The  cause  of   
this  accident  however  helps  to  indicate  the  pressures  being  felt  by  the  rolling  stock   
being  used  on  the  network,  as  the  locomotive  at  the  head  of  this  train,  an  express   
for  Ireland,  had  been  struck  by  the  metal  connecting  rod  of  a  passing  express  train  from   
Rugby  to  London  which  had  become  loose  and  flown  out  of  its  proper  place  whilst  the   
train  was  in  motion.77  Whilst  this  type  of  problem  on  railway  locomotives  was  not   
unheard  of,  both  before  the  First  World  War  and  in  the  subsequent  years  in  which   
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steam  locomotives  were  being  used  on  the  railways,  the  factor  that  a  defect  in  the   
crank  pins,  the  piece  of  metal  holding  the  connecting  rod  onto  the  drive  wheel  of  the   
locomotive,  had  not  been  detected  by  the  driver  of  the  Rugby  to  London  express  before   
he  took  his  train  out  onto  the  mainline  shows  that  pressure  on  the  rolling  stock,  in  the   
desire  to  keep  every  available  piece  of  rolling  stock  running  for  as  long  as  possible,  was   
being  mirrored  by  the  staff  who  had  to  operate  the  locomotives,  and  the  ultimate  need   
to  keep  the  trains  running  during  the  war  period.  The  final  major  railway  accident  to   
occur  in  1915  happened  on  the  17th  of  December  at  St  Bede’s  Junction  near  South   
Shields  on  the  GER.  The  accident,  involving  the  7:05am  train  from  South  Shields,  a  light   
engine  which  was  on  the  same  line,  and  an  empty  passenger  stock  working  from   
Jarrow,  resulted  in  19  deaths  and  large  numbers  of  injuries.  It  was  found  that  fire  was    
a  major  cause  of  the  death  toll.78  After  1915,  1916  surprisingly  witnessed  no  major   
railway  accidents,  and  as  such  the  next  major  accidents  to  occur  on  the  railways   
happened  during  the  course  of  1917  and  1918,  the  first  being  on  the  3rd  of  January   
1917  and  mirrored  what  had  occurred  at  South  Shields  in  December  1915,  but  instead   
happening  at  Ratho  station  near  Carlisle,  and  involving  the  16:18pm  express  between   
Edinburgh  and  Glasgow.  12  people  were  reported  to  have  been  killed.79  The  final   
accident  to  occur  on  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War  period  occurred  at  Little   
Salkeld,  15  miles  south  of  Carlisle  on  the  Midland  Mainline  and  involved  the  London  to   
Glasgow  express  running  into  a  railway  cutting  in  which  part  of  the  structure  had   
collapsed  onto  the  line,  and  resulted  in  seven  deaths.80  
 
These  accidents  are  the  ones  to  occur  involving  non-railway  personnel,  and  when  the   
minor  incidents  involving  railway  personnel  is  included,  the  list  becomes  far  too  long  to   
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do  justice  to  each  and  every  case.81  However,  by  including  these  as  accidents  to  happen   
on  the  railways,  combined  with  the  cases  outlined  above,  it  is  possible  to  come  to  the   
conclusion  that  life  on  the  railways  during  this  period  was  being  made  more  difficult   
because  of  the  war.  Whilst  accidents  on  the  railways  before  the  war  were  not  unheard   
of,  due  to  the  complicated  and  potentially  dangerous  nature  in  which  railways  operated,   
the  pressures  that  the  railways  faced  during  the  war,  both  in  terms  of  pressures  placed   
upon  railway  personnel,  as  well  as  pressures  place  on  rolling  stock  and  lack  of   
maintenance  on  infrastructure,  all  show  that  the  railways,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the   
nation,  were  struggling  to  carry  out  their  First  World  War  service,  but  still  managed  to   
keep  the  trains  moving,  and  by  proxy,  keep  the  British  war  effort  moving. 
 
Conclusions:  The  role  of  the  REC  
Operations  on  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War  became  almost  entirely   
dependent  on  the  authority  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee.  The  REC  itself,  acting   
in  a  supervisory  capacity  to  the  rail  companies  across  the  nation,  had  and  exercised   
authority  over  complete  operations  on  the  railway  network,  and  as  such  every  rail   
movement  needed  to  be  seen  to  be  working  towards  the  national  war  effort.  Before  the   
war,  such  governmental  supervision  on  rail  operations,  even  down  to  the  extent  as  to   
withdrawal  of  specific  types  of  rolling  stock  from  individual  train  services,  would  have   
been  considered  completely  unacceptable,  but  at  for  the  duration  of  the  conflict  Britain  
became  almost  dependent  on  her  railways  to  maintain  supplies  heading  for  the  front   
lines,  and  as  such  some  sacrifices  from  the  rail  companies  needed  to  be  made,  and  this   
 
81 Railway Accidents: Summary of Accidents and Casualties reported to the Board of Trade during the three months 
ending 30th June 1914, 1914, accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk;  Railway Accidents: Summary of 
Accidents and Casualties reported to the Board of Trade during the three months ending 31st December 1914, 1915, 
accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk; Railway Accidents: Summary of Accidents and Casualties 
reported to the Board of Trade during the three months ending 30th June 1915, 1915, accessed in PDF format via 
www.parlipapers.co.uk; General Report to the Board of Trade upon the Accidents that have occurred on the 
Railways of the United Kingdom during the year 1915, 1916, accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk   
46 | P a g e  
 
took  the  shape  of  coordination  and  supervisory  control  from  the  government  through   
the  REC.  Other  strategies  adopted  by  the  REC  were  focused  specifically  on  deterring  
unnecessary  travel  on  the  railways,  and  this  was  achieved  through  the  removal  of   
excursion  traffic  and  cheap  fares  for  members  of  the  public.  For  members  of  the  armed   
forces  however,  the  REC’s policy  of  supplementing  the  costs  of  soldiers’  travel  showed   
that  the  government  was  working  with  the  railway  companies,  rather  than  merely   
controlling  them.  The  concept  of  nationalization  was  at  this  point  in  the  history  of   
Britain’s  railways  unpalatable  to  both  the  private  companies  and  the  government,  despite   
the  railways  being  in  a  severely  run-down  state  by  the  end  of  the  conflict  and  in  dire   
need  of  mass  investment.  It  is  notable  that  the  governmental  supervisory  control  of  the   
railways  did  not  merely  end  in  1918/1919,  and  instead  continued  well  into  the  new   
decade,  only  completely  ceasing  with  the  grouping  of  the  ‘Big  Four’  railway  companies   
at  the  end  of  1922  and  into  1923,  and  this  goes  to  show  how  important  the  railways,   
and  by  proxy,  the  REC  had  become  to  the  British  economy  by  the  end  of  the  conflict  
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Chapter  Two: 
“22nd  of  May  1915  –  The  Quintinshill  Rail  Disaster” 
 
On  the  morning  of  the  22nd  of  May  1915,  Britain’s  railways  faced  the  worst  collision  to   
occur  on  the  network  since  their  invention.  In  addition  to  presenting  the  railways  with  a   
tragic  human  cost  when  the  systems  controlling  the  network  went  wrong,  the  events   
that  unfolded  at Quintinshill,  just  north  of  the  Scottish  border  on  the  West  Coast   
Mainline,  presented  several  major  questions  into  safety  implications  of  operations  on  the   
railways  during  a  time  of  national  crisis.  The  collision  itself,  although  not  without   
precedent  as  shall  be  seen,  can  be  viewed  as  a  shifting  point,  in  that  it  was  recognized   
that  pre-war  peacetime  focuses  could  not  be  continued  during  wartime.  The  main   
document  used  to  form  this  account  of  the  events  is  the  Summary  of  Railway  Accidents   
for  the  three  months  ending  30th  of  June  1915  and  it  is  perhaps  worth  first  outlining   
the  significance  of  this  document  to  any  study  investigating events  at  Quintinshill.  
 
Summary  of  Railway  Accidents  documents  were  generally  published  based  on  three   
months’  worth  of  data  around  four  times  a  year,  and  acted  as  the  official  records  from   
the  Board  of  Trade  to  the  government  as  to  the  state  of  Britain’s  railways.  Contained  
within  the  Summary  report  for  the  three  months  ending  30th  of  June  1915  is  the  full   
enquiry  report  undertaken  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Druitt,  containing  full  transcripts  of   
eyewitness  testimony  from  individuals  at  the  scene  of  the  disaster.  The  original  report   
document  is  held  at  the  National  Archives.82  As  a  side  note  detailing  Druitt  as  an   
individual,  Druitt  had  been  appointed  officer  in  charge  to  conduct  the  investigation  into   
the  disaster  by  HM  Railway  Inspectorate,  a  board  with  its  origins  in  1840  and  tasked   
with  overseeing  general  safety  on  all  the  railways  of  Britain.83  All  commissioned  officers   
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of  the  Inspectorate  were  retirees  who  had  been  involved  in  some  way  with  the  railway   
divisions  of  the  Royal  Engineers,  meaning  Druitt  had  been  involved  with  operations  on   
railways  for  military  purposes  before  commission.84  Perhaps  significant  is  that  this   
enquiry  report  is  not  a  set  of  criminal papers,  instead  supposedly  being  an  unbiased   
objective  record  of  what  happened.  The  reason  that  this  is  only  supposedly  an  unbiased   
set  of  records  is  that  the  enquiry  findings  were  in  fact  presented  to  Druitt  by  the   
CR,  who  themselves  conducted  an  internal  enquiry  into  the  cause  of  the  disaster  in  the   
weeks  following  the  event85,  with  Druitt  in  turn  accepting  the  findings  and  presenting   
them  to  the  Board  of  Trade.  Although  Druitt  did  conduct  an  enquiry  into  the  disaster,   
his  findings  appear  to  be  heavily  based  on  the  findings  he  was  presented  with  by  the   
CR.   However,  despite  this  oversight  in  the  report’s  history,  the  official  enquiry  still  does   
provide  a  plethora  of  information  and  details  about  the  disaster  which  are  unable  to  be   
sourced  from  other  locations.  The  criminal  trial  which  took  place  after  the  disaster   
focused  more  on  the  questions  surrounding  who  was  responsible  for  what  happened,   
rather  than  what  actually  happened  and  the  implications  for  the  rail  network.  Druitt’s   
enquiry  report  does  not  have  this  issue  until  the  conclusions  and  advice  section  after   
the  eyewitness  testimony  has  been  presented  in  full.  
 
Geographical  and  Chronological  Context 
Before  dealing  with  the  events  that  unfolded  at  the  isolated  signal  box  just  north  of   
Gretna,  context  surrounding  both  the  location  and  the  operational  situation  need  to  be   
explored.  In  1915  the  West  Coast  mainline  route  between  London  and  Glasgow  was  one   
of  three  rail  routes competing  for  the  lucrative  Anglo-Scottish  express  passenger  trade,   
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and  was  managed  by  two separate  railway  companies,  the  London  and  North  Western   
Railway  (LNWR)  and  the  Caledonian  Railway  (CR).86  Of  the  three  mainlines  linking   
England  and  Scotland,  the  West  Coast  route  was,  and  remains  to  this  day,  the  most   
difficult  to  operate.  The  route  navigates  the  Cumbrian  hills,  climbing  over  the summits  at   
Grayrigg  and  Shap  before  tackling  the  climb  of  Beattock  in  the  Scottish  lowlands,  yet   
was  still  able  to  compete  with  the  East  Coast  route,  which  has  always  been  known  as   
‘the  race track’  on  the  British  railway  network.  In  addition  to  this,  the  West  Coast   
mainline  at  the  beginning  of  the  20th  Century  was  one  of  the  most  congested  in  the   
country.  The  mainline  between  Carlisle  and  Glasgow  was  at  times  amongst  the  busiest   
double  track  sections  of  line  in  the  country,  due  in  part  to  no  less  than  three  separate   
rail  companies  having  running  rights  within  the  first  8½  miles  between  Carlisle  Citadel   
Station  and  Gretna  Junction,  these  being  the  CR;  the  Glasgow  and  South  Western   
(G&SWR);  and  the  North  British  Railway  (NBR).87  This  meant  that  the  vast  amount  of   
freight  traffic  handled  by  each  of  these  rail  companies  needed  processing  and  storing  at   
Carlisle  before  dispatch  across  the  nation.  At  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  freight  yards   
north  of  Carlisle  which  became  known  as  Carlisle  Kingmoor  had  not  yet  been  built,   
although  the  locomotive  sheds  of  Kingmoor  were  in  operation,  and  so  all  freight  traffic   
had  to  be  transported  just  to  the  south  of  Carlisle  to  Dentholme  yard  for  dispatch  with   
the  LNWR,  the  Midland  Railway  (MR)  and  the  North  Eastern  Railway  (NER).88  This  factor   
meant  that  the  Carlisle  to  Gretna  junction  section  of  the  route  became  something  of  a   
bottleneck,  and  as  such  in  the  years  before  the  war  the  CR  found  it  necessary  to  install   
long  running  loops  on  both  sides  of  the  main  line.  These  installations  took  place  at  the   
signal  box  at  Quintinshill,  1½  miles  north  of  Gretna  and  a  section  of  trackwork  that  had   
 
86 Richards & Searle, pg. 9  
87 O.S. Nock, Historic Railway Disasters: Fourth Edition (Shepperton; Ian Allen Ltd. 1987) pp. 88-95 
88 Nock, pp. 88-95 
50 | P a g e  
 
a  main  line  crossover  already  installed89,  and  it  is  these  loop  lines  that  played  one  of   
the  major  factors  in  the  disaster  that  occurred  on  the  22nd  of  May  1915.  
 
The  Beginnings  of  the  Disaster 
At  this  early  stage  of  the  war  it  can  be  seen  that  the  railway  companies  dealing  with   
traffic  heading  northwards  did  not  completely  appreciate  the  intensive  strain  that  the   
war  effort  placed  on  the  network,  and  as  such  the  philosophy  of  express  passenger   
traffic  before  all  else  was  continued  from  the  peacetime  situation  by  some  companies   
including,  most  significantly  in  the  events  of  Quintinshill,  the  CR.  As  such,  when  on  the   
night  of  21st  of  May  1915  the  11.45pm  overnight  sleeper train  from  London  Euston  to   
Edinburgh  Waverley  departed  London  an  half  an  hour  behind  schedule90,  the  aim  for  the   
train  crew  was  to  regain  as  much  lost  time  as  possible.  The  late  running  of  the   
overnight  sleeper  was  something  that  at  the  time  would  not  have  seemed  too   
significant.  To  the  railway  companies  it  would  have  been  an  annoyance  certainly,  but   
not  something  that  would  raise  too  much  concern  regarding  the  implications  that  it  was   
to  have  on  the  rest  of  the  rail  network  on  the  run  northwards.  
 
Making  up  time  on  the  sleeper  train  proved  to  be  an  impossible  task,  and  by  the  time   
the  sleeper  train  pulled  into  Carlisle  Citadel  station  almost  300  miles  after  leaving   
London,  the  train was  still  running  half  an  hour  behind  schedule.91  At  Carlisle  Citadel,  the   
overnight  sleeper  was  due  to  split  into  two  sections,  the  first  proceeding  to  Edinburgh   
Waverley,  and  the  second continuing  onwards  to  Glasgow  Central.  This  was  due   
before  the  dispatching  of  the  6:17am  local  service  from  Carlisle  to  Beattock,  stopping  at   
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all  stations  to  pick  up  and  set  down  passengers,  however  due  to  the  late  running,  the   
decision  had  been  taken  to  dispatch  the  6:17am  local  service  before  the  expresses92,  a   
decision  that  was  taken  no  doubt  as  to  avoid  delaying  the  connection  at  Beattock  for   
which  the  locomotive  of  the  6:17am  was  to  be  used.93  The  Glasgow  portion  of  the   
sleeper  train,  due  to  depart  Carlisle  at  6.05am  was  dispatched  at  6.37am  heading   
northwards,  the  Edinburgh  portion  of  the  train  having  been  dispatched  a  number  of   
minutes  before  and  able  to  proceed  past  Quintinshill  before  the  collision  happened.  
 
At  the  same  time,  a  train  which  had  originated  in  Leith  in  the  early  hours  of  the   
morning  and  heading  for  Liverpool  was  making  its  way  southwards  over  the  southern   
hills  of  Scotland.  This  train,  a  troop  train,  containing  1st  Battalion  of  the  7th  Royal   
Scots94,  was  on  route  to  Gallipoli,  the  campaign  in  southern  Turkey  which  had  just  been   
launched  by  the  military.  It  is  with  this  troop  train  however  that  a  second  factor  in  the   
disaster  was  to  come  into  play.  The  carriages  that  conveyed  the  troops  from  Leith  to   
Quintinshill  were  themselves  relics  of  a  by-gone  era  of  railway  travel.  Comprised  of   
wooden  bodied  vehicles  lit  by  gas95,  they  had  originated  on  the  Great  Central  Railway   
(GCR)  during  the  previous  century  and  were  by  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities   
considered  dangerous  by  officials.  Five  years  prior  to  what  happened  at  Quintinshill  an   
accident  just  north  of  Hawes  Junction,  or  Garsdale,  on  the  Settle  to  Carlisle  railway  was   
to  show  the  danger  of  having  wooden  bodied  passenger  stock  that  was  lit  by  gas  being   
used  in  high  speed  trains,  and  in  the  case  of  the  Hawes  Junction  accident,  the  presence   
of  flammable  material  and  gas  served  only  to  destroy  the  carriages  beyond  feasible   
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repair.96  In  the  aftermath  of  this  accident,  the  advice  of  the  Board  of  Trade  was  that  all   
gas  lit  passenger  rolling  stock  was  to  be  phased  out  of  service  and  replaced  by  flame   
retardant,  electrically  lit  stock.  However,  although  this  process  had  begun  by  the  time  of   
the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  it  had  not  been  completed  and  as  such,  several  hundred  gas   
lit  wooden  bodied  vehicles  remained  in  use  on  the  rail  network  and  were  pressed  into   
service  to  which  they  were  unsuitable  due  to  the  need  to  use  every  available  piece  of   
rolling  stock  for  the  war  effort.  The  rolling  stock  share  scheme  that  had  been  unveiled   
in  the  first  few  months  of  the  war  meant  that  regardless  of  origin,  every  piece  of   
rolling  stock  on  the  rail  network,  with  the  exception  of  locomotives,  was  now  to  be   
made  use  of  all  over  the  country,  meaning  that  GCR  rolling  stock  found  its  way  into  the   
train  makeup  of  CR  services97,  and  gas  lit  passenger  rolling  stock  found  its  way  into   
inappropriate  use  on  high  speed  express  passenger  trains.  
 
Quintinshill  –  The  isolated  signal  box 
The  scene  at  Quintinshill  itself  in  the  hours  before  the  collision  proves  significant  in  the   
events  that  were  to  come  later  that  morning.  Although  the  additional  storage  had  been   
installed  at  Quintinshill  in  the  form  of  the  loop  lines  in  the  years  before  the  war,  on   
the  morning  of  the  22nd  of  May  both  loop  lines  had  been  earmarked  for  other   
purposes.  The  down  loop  line,  on  the  Glasgow  side  of  the  running  lines,  had  been   
occupied  by  a  goods  train  and  the  up  loop  line,  on  the  Carlisle  side  of  the  running  lines   
and  directly  in  front  of  the  signal  box,  was  soon  to  be  occupied  by  an  empty  coal  train   
heading  for  South  Wales.98  Since  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  traditional  method  of   
 
96 Report by Major Pringle R.E. on the Fatal Collision the occurred on the 24th December 1910, between an Express 
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transporting  coal  from  the  South  Wales  coalfields  to  the  base  of  the  Grand  Fleet  at   
Scapa  Flow  via  sea  had  become  no  longer  viable  due  to  the  German  U-Boat  campaign   
in  the  Atlantic  and  Irish  seas.  This  meant  that  traffic  for  the  Grand  Fleet  required   
sending  via  rail,  and  these  workings  themselves  gained  the  nickname  ‘Jellico  Specials’.99   
On  that  morning  the  decision  was  taken  to  side-line  the  empty  coal  train  to  allow  the   
troop  train  to  pass  on  the  main  running  line.   
 
Provided  below  is  a  diagram  demonstrating  the  trackwork  layout  at  Quintinshill,  and  the   
placement  of  trains  that  morning.100 
 
This  factor  of  too  many  trains  in  this  one  section  of  line  proved  a  problem  for  the   
signalman  on  duty,  George  Meakin.  Meakin  had  officially  worked  the  overnight  shift   
within  Quintinshill  signal  box  and  was  due  to  finish  at  6am.  In  his  later  testimony   
provided  to  Colonel  Druitt’s  enquiry   Meakin  states  that  the  working  patterns  of   
Quintinshill’s  signal  box  was  the  day  shift  between  6am  and  4pm;  the  evening  shift   
between  4pm  and  8pm;  and  the  overnight  shift  between  8pm  and  6am  the  following   
morning.101  However,  an  unofficial  arrangement  between  Meakin  and  James  Tinsley,  the   
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signalman  due  to  relieve  Meakin  at  6am,  meant  that  the  night  signalman  would   
continue  working  the  section  of  signals  until  the  arrival  of  the  local  train  from  Carlisle,   
which  would  have  transported  the  relief  man  to  the  signal box  from  the  station  at   
Gretna.  This  arrangement  was  unknown  by  the  stationmaster  at  Gretna  station,  Robert   
Killin,  the  man  responsible  for  the  section  of  track,  as  well  as  the  District   
Superintendent  for  Quintinshill  and  the  Inspector  of  the  District,  all  of  which  is   
confirmed  by  Meakin,  Tinsley  and  Killin  in  their  testimony.  That  day,  Meakin  states  that   
when  Tinsley  didn’t  turn  up  at  the  box  at  6am  he  realized  that  he  must  be  travelling  to   
work  on  board  the  6:17am  local  train  ex-Carlisle,  which  he  was  offered  at  6:20am  and   
arrived  at  the  box  at  6:30am.  Upon  his  arrival  at  the  box,  Tinsley  was  made  aware  of   
the  situation  regarding  train  movements,  as  well  as  being  handed  a  sheet  of  paper  in   
which  Meakin  had  written  down  train  movements  since  6am102,  this  being  an  attempt  to   
prevent  the  late  changeover  arrangement  being  discovered  due  to  the  change  of   
handwriting  in  the  train  register  book  held  at  the  signal  box  being  later  than  the   
regulation  time  of  6am.103   
 
At  this  point,  Meakin  should  have  left  the  box  as  his  shift  was  over.  He  did  not  do   
however,  choosing  instead  to  remain  in  the  box  reading  a  newspaper  which  had  arrived   
with  Tinsley.104  Aware  of  the  expresses  heading  towards  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh,  Meakin   
had  taken  the  decision  to  shunt  the  6.17am  local  from  the  northbound  to  the   
southbound  running  line,  using  the  crossover  before  Tinsley  arrived  in  the  box,  the   
shunting  operation  being  completed  once  Tinsley  had  arrived  at  his  post.  Providing  that   
the  correct  procedures  were  observed,  this  movement  should  not  have  been  the  one   
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that  would  cause  disaster,  and  indeed  in  the  months  before  the events  of  the  22nd  of   
May,  this  movement  of  switching  the  local  between  running  lines  had  been  undertaken   
13  times  without  issue.105  The  obvious  question  in  this  instance  should  be  what   
happened  that  resulted  in  the  disaster?  Part  of  the  reason  must  lie  with  signalman   
James  Tinsley.  In  his  testimony,  Tinsley  claimed  that  he  had  simply  forgotten  that  the   
local  train  was  standing  on  the  wrong  line  as  he  busied  himself  with  catching  up  on   
writing  train  movements  in  the  register  book.106  This,  combined  with  the  additional   
factors  that  Meakin  had  not  been  using  the  signal  lever  collars  as  protocol  dictated,  a   
simple  safety  feature  which  required  the  signalman  to  place  a  metal  collar  on  a  signal   
lever  for  which  operated  a  line  blocked  by  other  traffic,  or  given  a  blocking  back  signal   
to  the  Kirkpatrick  signal  box  to  the  north  of  Quintinshill  indicating  an  obstruction  was   
now  present  on  the  main  running  line107,   meant  that  Tinsley,  already  preoccupied  and   
seemingly  not  looking  out  of  the  signal  box  window,  pulled  the  levers  allowing  the  troop   
train  into  the  section  and  directly  into  the  front  of  the  locomotive  at  the  head  of  the   
6.17am  local  train. 
 
As  well  as  being  preoccupied,  later  revelations  surrounding  Tinsley’s  mental  health,  these   
being  the  possibility  that  Tinsley  was  suffering  with  epilepsy  and  may  have  had  a  mild   
epileptic  fit  whilst  in  the  box  resulting  in  a  lapse  in  memory108  all  add  to  the  plausibility   
of  Tinsley’s  testimony  to  Druitt.  As  well  as  lowering  the  signals  for  the  troop  train   
approaching  from  the  Kirkpatrick  section  to  the  north,  Tinsley  had  been  offered  the   
second  of  the  two  expresses  from  the  Gretna  signal  box,  and  accepted  the  train  into  his   
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section  of  signals,  lowering  the  signals  to  allow  the  express  to  pass  through  without   
stopping.109  With  the  second  express  now  signaled  to  proceed  through  the  section,   
Tinsley  continued  copying  train  movements  from  the  scrap  paper  into  the   register  book,   
all  the  while  breaking  another  of  the  CR’s  regulations,  this  time  relating  to  the  numbers   
of  railway  personnel  being  present  within  the  signal  box.  By  the  rule,  the  only  person   
that  should  have  been  in  the  signal  box  at  that  time  was  Tinsley  himself,  possibly  to  be   
joined  by  George  Hutchison  as  the  fireman  of  the  local  train  to  ensure  that  the  6.17am   
local  had  been  protected  by  signals,  being  as  it  was  in  a  place  of  potential  danger,   
carrying  out  rule  55  of  the  CR.  Hutchison,  in  accordance  with  rule  55 ,  signed  the   
signal  box  register  stating  that  he  had  visited  the  box.  Although  Hutchison  did  sign  his   
name,  he  later  confirmed  in  his  testimony  that  he  did  not  ensure  that  his  train  had   
been  properly  protected,  signing  the  book  merely  as  a  formality.  This,  combined  with   
a  shunter  of  the  already  stationary  goods  train  sitting  in  the  down  loop,  and  Meakin   
who  had  not  immediately  left  the  box  after  his  shift  had  finished,  all  added  to  the   
possibility  that  Tinsley  had  been  further  distracted  from  his  work.  Although  all  men   
swore  under  oath  that  there  had  been  no  conversation  happening  between  them  at  the   
time  of  the  collision,  Meakin  admitted  that  he  may  have  made  Tinsley  aware  of  news  of   
the  war  from  the  paper,  and  that  he  could  not  be  certain  because  of  the  speed  at   
which  events  unfolded.110  
 
The  Head  On  Collision 
Hutchison  claimed  that  after  signing  his  name  in  the  register  book  he  left  the  signal  box   
and  headed  back  towards  his  engine  underneath  the  wagons  of  the  empty  coal  train,   
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something  that  although  dangerous,  was  not  a  violation  of  railway  regulations  at  that   
time.111  Whilst  back  on  his  engine’s  footplate,  he  prepared  to  take  a  snack  break  by   
opening  his  piece  box,  taking  advantage  of  the  few  moments  rest  before  continuing  the   
journey  upon  the  steep  gradients  towards  Beattock.  Hutchison  told  Druitt  that  he   
glanced  upwards  out  of  the  cab  window  and  noticed  the  signals  set  for  the  road  ahead   
of  him,  these  being  all  clear.  According  to  the  testimony  provided  in  the  report,   
Hutchinson  immediately  made  driver,  David  Wallace,  aware  of  this  and  Wallace  looked   
at  the  signals  to  check,  to  find  the  locomotive  of  the  troop  train  heading  straight   
towards  his  own  stationary  train  at  an  estimated  speed  of  around  70mph.112  Unable  to   
do  anything  to  prevent  collision,  both  Wallace  and  Hutchison claim  to  have  leapt  from   
the  footplate  and  taking  cover  underneath  the  wagons  of  the  goods  train  standing  to   
the  side  of  them.113  The  driver  of  the  troop  train,  Francis  Scott,  once  considered  the   
premier  driver  of  the  Caledonian  Railway  and  a  man  who  had  previously  driven   
locomotives  on  royal  train  duties  escorting  Queen  Victoria,  King  Edward  VII  and  King   
George  V114,  must  have  spotted  the  stationary  local  train  standing  directly  in  his  path   
and  immediately  slammed  on  his  brakes. 
 
The  brakes  used  on  the  troop  train  prove  significant  to  the  overarching  events.  As  a   
principle,  the  CR  fitted  its  locomotives  with  the  Westinghouse  system  of  air  braking.  The   
Westinghouse  system,  developed  in  the  USA  by  George  Westinghouse,  required  the   
locomotive  to  be  fitted  with  an  air  pump,  an  air-pressure  regulator  and  an  air  reservoir,   
and  the  vehicles  in  the  train  makeup  needed  an  air  reservoir,  brake  cylinder  and  triple   
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valve.  When  the  system  was  being  charged,  the  triple  valve  vents  the  brake  cylinder  and   
charges  the  reservoir  until  the  pressure  in  both  the  cylinder  and  the  reservoir  are   
almost  equal.  At  this  point  the  brakes  release.  The  application  of  the  brake  reduces  the   
pressure  in  the  train  pipe  and  isolates’  from  the  reservoir,  which  in  turn  admits  air  into   
the  brake  cylinder  in  proportion  to  the  reduction  in  pressure  in  the  main  pipe.  This   
allows  the  system  to  be  powerful  and  quick  acting.115  This  is  significant  when  looking  at   
the  train  makeup  of  the  troop  train  because,  although  the  locomotive  and  a  small   
number  of  the  vehicles  in  the  train  were  fitted  with  the  Westinghouse  system,  not  all   
the  vehicles  were  so  fitted.  As  the  carriages  had  originated  on  the  GCR,  they  were  fitted   
with  the  vacuum  system  of  braking.  The  locomotives  of  the  CR  were  fitted  to  deal  with   
this  system,  the  so  called  dual  braking  fitment  wherein  both  air  and  vacuum  brakes   
were  able  to  be  operated  from  the  locomotive,  but  the  vacuum  system  was  not  as  fast   
acting  as  the  air  braking  system116,  meaning  that  a  proportion  of  the  troop  train  may   
still  have  had  brakes  released  at  the  time  of  the  collision. 
 
Although  they  were  able  to  slow  the  troop  train,  the  brakes  were  not  capable  of   
bringing  it  to  a  stand  in  the  allotted  space,  and  as  such  Scott’s  locomotive,  CR   
Dunalastair  VI  class  No.  121117,  ploughed  into  the  locomotive  at  the  head  of  the  local   
train,  CR  Cardean  Class  No.  907118,  recently  outshopped  from  the  workshop  of St.  Rollox,   
Glasgow  and  working  its  first  running  in  train  before  returning  to  premier  express  duty.   
This  locomotive,  sister  engine  of  flagship  locomotive  of  the  CR,  was  shunted  back  some   
40  yards  and  derailed,  along  with  its  tender,  suffering  severe  damage  to  both   
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locomotive  and  tender,  the  latter  of  which  had  its  tank  ruptured  at  the  rear.119  No. 121   
of  the  troop  train  was  itself  separated  from  its  tender  and  thrown  to  the  right,  the   
tender  being  thrown  to  the  left120,  and  the  crew  were  killed  instantly.  The  leading   
vehicles  of  the  troop  train  were  catapulted  over  the  locomotive  and  tender  whilst  the   
remainder  stayed  on  the  rails  but  were  disintegrated  except  for  the  CR  vans  at  the  rear   
of  the  train.121  The  troop  train,  some  213  yards  in  length  before  the  collision,  was   
compressed  into  measuring  just  67  yards  after  the  event122,  and  the  wooden  bodied   
coaches  lay  splintered  over  both  running  lines.  The  local  train  fared  slightly  better  as   
with  the  rupturing  of  the  tender  tank  at  the  rear  of   the  locomotive,  the  coupling   
attaching  the  carriages  to  the  locomotive  snapped,  allowing  the  four  coaches  to  roll   
backward  some  100  yards123  and  to  relative  safety  of  what  was  come  in  the  aftermath   
of  the  second  collision  still  to  take  place,  although  it  must  be  noted  that  on  board  the   
local  there  were  two  fatalities.124  
 
The  Moments  After  and  The  Second  Collision  
Due  to  the  speed  at  which  events  happened,  accounts  of  the  moments  between  the   
two  collisions  are  somewhat  hazy.  The  testimony  of  Meakin  and  Tinsley  both   
corroborate  the  main  details  of  actions  undertaken  in  the  signal  box  once  it  was   
realized  what  was  happening.  Meakin  states  that  he  had  got  up  and  proceeded  to  leave   
and  had  reached  the  steps  leading   down  from  the  box  cabin  when  the  first  collision   
occurred.  Meakin  then  claims  to  have  rushed  back  into  the  box  and,  after  asking  what   
Tinsley  had  done,  instructed  Tinsley  to  put  all  signals  to  danger  and  send  the  danger   
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signal  to  the  boxes  in  both  directions,  both  realizing  that  the  second  express  had  not   
yet  passed  by.125 
 
According  to  testimony  provided  to  Druitt,  at  the  same  time  as  actions  in  the  signal   
box,  the  guard  of  the  local  train,  Douglas  Graham,  had  managed  to  alight  from  the   
carriages  down  to  the  track  bed  and,  also  having  remembered  that  the  second  express   
had  not  yet  passed,  proceeded  to  run  back  along  the  line  waving  his  arms  in  the  hope   
of  attracting  the  attention  the  express  train’s  crew.126  He  had  been  joined  by  the  crew   
of  the  empty  coal  train,  driver  James  Benson  and  fireman  John  Grierson.127  It  has  been   
estimated  that  Graham,  aged  46  years,  had  managed  some  167  yards  from  the  rear  of   
his  train’s  carriages128,  which  had  themselves  rolled  100  yards  backwards  after  the   
collision.  This  was  commended  as,  although  it  is  not  known  which  area  of  the  track   
Graham  ran  down,  either  the  center  of  the  track,  otherwise  known  as  the  four  foot,  or   
by  the  side  of  the  track,  neither  presented  an  easy  route  for  running  back  along  the   
line.  The  second  express  was  hauled  by  two  locomotives,  Nos.  140  and  48129,  and  it  was   
hoped  that  with  two  locomotives  heading  the  train,  it  might  be  able  to  regain  lost  time.   
 
The  accepted  principle  of  railway  operation  at  the  time,  and  even  to  this  day,  was  that   
if  in  doubt  stop  all  train  movements,  and  the  waving  of  arms  by  Graham,  Benson  and   
Grierson  would  have  signaled  danger.  These  hand  signals  were  first  sighted  by  the   
fireman  on  the  leading  locomotive,  David  Todbunter,  who  alerted  his  driver,  John   
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Cowper,  before  Cowper  proceeded  to  apply  the  brakes.  The  driver  of  the  second   
locomotive,  Andrew  Johnstone,  also  applied  the  brakes  on  his  locomotive  at  the  same   
time  as  Cowper,  having  also  been  made  aware  of  the  signals  being  given  by  Graham.130   
Despite  the  efforts  of  both,  the  express  was  travelling  too  fast  and  was  too  close  to  the   
wreckage  for  a  second  impact  to  be  avoided,  and  less  than  two  minutes  after  the  initial   
impact,  the  express  train  collided  with  the  wreckage  of  the  troop  train  scattered  across   
both  running  lines.  The  braking  of  both  locomotives  had  managed  to  reduce  the  speed   
of  the  express  from  an  estimated  50mph  to  around  40mph.131  In  his  testimony,  Cowper  
stated  that  the  initial  impact  was  soft,  with  his  locomotive  striking  the  splintered  wood   
and  smashed  glass  remains,  but  that  this  soon  changed  to  a  sharp  thud  which  almost   
brought  his  locomotive  to  a  stand  as  the  tender  of  the  troop  train  locomotive  was   
struck.132  His  locomotive,  No.  140,  mounted  the  remains  and  rode  into  the  air,  and  this   
can  be  observed  in  the  following  photograph  taken  during  the  clear  up  operation.133   
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The  result  of  this  was  that  Cowper  found  himself  pinned  in  the  left  hand  corner  of  the   
cab  and  buried  up  to  his  neck  with  coal  from  the  tender,  his  back  facing  the   
locomotive  firebox  and  boiler  backhead.134  Cowper  escaped  with  the  help  of  Todbunter   
and  Johnstone,  as  confirmed  in  their  testimonies,  and  suffered  considerable  bruising  and   
burns  below  the  neck.  These  injuries  were  tended  to  in  the  field  alongside  the  railway,   
and  Cowper,  a  man  in  his  sixties  and  himself  suffering,  joined  in  with  the  rescue  efforts.   
In  contrary  to  Cowper’s  injuries,  Johnstone  and  Graham  on  their  locomotive  were   
relatively  cushioned  from  the  impact  and  escaped  almost  entirely  without  injury.135 
 
With  the  presence  of  the  two  trains  standing  in  both  loop  lines  the  result  of  this   
second  collision  was  a  five-train  crash  as  the  debris  of  the  three-train  collision  spread   
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into  the  stationary  goods  and  empty  coal  trains  standing  either  side.  
 
Gas  Fueled  Fire   
One  of  the  significant  lines  of  enquiry  undertaken  by  the  Druitt  enquiry  was  the   
significance  of  gas  canisters  used  to  light  the  carriages  of  the  troop  train.  Although  it  is   
noted  that  the  presence  of  gas  alone  did  not  cause  the  outbreak  of  fire,  instead  the   
outbreak  occurring  due  live  coals  from  the  firebox  of  the  overturned  troop  train   
locomotive  escaping  and  igniting  the wooden  frames  and  debris  of  the  troop  train   
carriages136,  the  violence  of  the  collision  caused  the  gas  cylinders  to  explode  and  allow   
gas  to  escape.  The  cylinders  had  be  fully  charged  at  Leith  before  departure,  so  by  the   
time  they  reached  Quintinshill  they  would  still  have  been relatively  full,  meaning  that  the   
escape  of  gas  into  the  already  burning  debris  caused  the  fire  to  intensify.  Eyewitness   
testimony  of  several  individuals  states  that  the  cylinders  not  ruptured  by  the  collision   
exploded  when  the  fire  reached  them.137  For  some  of  the  soldiers  on  the  troop  train   
who  had  survived  the  initial  impact  it  was  the  fire  that  was  to  prove  fatal.  When  the   
express  had  collided  with  the  wreckage  it  cut  off  the  escape  route  for  many  beginning   
to  climb  out  from  the  debris.  It  must  be  noted  here  though  that  those  soldiers  who   
had  been  able  to  escape  and  assist  in  rescue  attempt  did  so  instinctively,  and  many  of   
the  survivors  who  awoke  later  did  so  because  of  the  efforts  of  their  comrades  and   
locals  from  the  area  surrounding  the  crash  site.138  The  scale  of  the  fire  can  be  observed   
in  the  following  photograph.139  
 
 
136 Document R 9884, 31st August 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA) 
137 Railway Accidents: Summary of Accidents and Casualties reported to the Board of Trade during the three months 
ending 30th June 1915, 1915, accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk  
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139 Photograph of the fire, accessed via https://www.itv.com/news/2015-05-22/quintinshill-rail-disaster-
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Local  help  is  discussed  further  in  chapter  three,  but  it  is  worth  briefly  stating  here  that   
the  efforts  of  locals  acted  as  the  first  response,  with  local  doctors  and  nurses  rushing  to   
the  site  and  providing  immediate  medical  treatment  where  possible.  Further  treatment   
was  to  come  in  the  form  of  emergency  trains  rostered  by  the  CR  company  itself,   
consisting  of  several  ambulance  trains  the  likes  seen  on  the  southern  coast  of  England   
for  the  return  of  injured  soldiers  from  the  front.140  The  first  of  these  arrived  at  the   
scene  at  8.10am,  and  this  relatively  quick  arrangement  was  commended  as  the   
organization  of  such  train  movements  were  under  normal  circumstances  a  lengthy  affair.   
Throughout  the  rest  of  the  day,  several  trains  made  the  trip  from  the  collision  site  to   
Carlisle  for  evaluation  and  treatment.  
 
The  fire  took  slightly  longer  to  deal  with  than  the transportation  of  the  injured.  The   
morning  following  the  disaster  the  remains  were  still  smoldering,  and  the  Carlisle  fire   
brigade  were  still  working  on  dampening  down  the  wreckage.  When  they  were  certain   
 
140 Richards & Seale, pp. 42-58 
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the  wreckage  was  safe  enough  to  move,  work  began  on  the  clearing  of  the  main  lines,   
with  the  remains  of  the  rolling  stock,  along  with  the  remains  of  the  locomotives  placed   
unceremoniously  on  the  side  of  the  line.  All  of  the  locomotives  involved  were   
transported  to  St  Rollox  works  for  evaluation  and  it  was  deemed  that  all  apart  from  No.   
48  were  beyond  repair,  meaning  that  the  locomotives  were  broken  up  for  scrap141,   
supposedly  much  to  the  dismay  and  reluctance  of  the  workers  at  St.  Rollox.142  Heavy   
lifting  cranes  were  dispatched  from  Glasgow  on  the  Sunday  night  to  assist  with  the  clear   
up  operation  whilst  the  damaged  track  was  replaced,  before  being  cleared  for  normal   
operation  by  the  passage  of  the  limited  mail  train  from  Glasgow,  due  into  Carlisle  at   
8:14pm.143  This  turnaround  was  remarkable  by  the  standards  of  the  day,  especially  for  a   
country  which  itself  was  amid  a  manpower  shortage  crisis.  
 
The  events  of  Quintinshill:  Conclusions  
The  events  that  took  place  at  Quintinshill  were  without  comparison  in  terms  of  scale,  if   
not  in  terms  of  nature.  For  a  country  that  was  already  in  the  grips  of  a  national  crisis   
with  the  munitions  shortage;  at  the  beginning  of  a  disastrous  military  campaign  and  
mere  weeks  after  the  sinking  of  an  ocean  liner,  itself  considered  a  disaster;  what   
unfolded  at  that  small,  seemingly  insignificant  signal  box  just  to  the  north  of  the   
Scottish  border  can  be  seen  as  a  horrible  end  to  a  disastrous  month.  When  Druitt  was   
tasked  to  conduct  his  enquiry,  he  is  likely  to  have  been  instructed  to  establish  just  how   
a  disaster  of  this  magnitude  could  have  occurred  on  homeland  soil.  As  such,  the  focus   
of  Druitt’s  enquiry  centered  mainly  on  the  sequence  of  events  beforehand,  whilst  in  his   
summarizing  conclusions  present  at  the  end  of  his  report,  Druitt  provided  his  own   
personal  comments  on  what  he  perceived  as  being  the  core  causes.  He  seemingly  lay   
 
141 Damage to Engines at Quintinshill on 22nd of May 1915, May 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA) 
142 Nock, pp. 88-95 
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sole  blame  for  the  events  at  the  feet  of  Meakin  and  Tinsley  for  not  using  the  signal   
lever  collars  and  the  late  changeover  arrangement  causing  a  distraction,  as  well  as  the   
presence  of  too  many  people  in  the  signal  box.  He  also  states  that  all  future  carriage   
construction  was  to  be  of  steel  and  lighting  provisions  were  to  be  electricity  due  to  the   
presence  of  gas  acting  as  a  factor  behind  the  intensity  of  the  fire,  apparently  aware   
that  the  use  of  outdated  rolling  stock  was  an  issue  that  was  facing  the  railways.  
 
The  events  of  the  Quintinshill  disaster  may  upon  brief  examination  appear  to  end   
following  the  clear  up  operation,  but  this  does  not  take  into  consideration  the  wider   
public  reaction  and  the  subsequent  desire  for  answers,  and  this  is  something  that  is   
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Example  Photographs  of  Rolling  Stock 
 

















Promotional  image  of  CR  ‘Cardean’  class  locomotive.  The  sister  engine  of  this  locomotive 




144 Photo of No. 121, accessed via 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/Quintinshill_rail_disaster_-_Caledonian_McIntosh_220-
121.jpg (05/09/2019) 
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Photograph  of  restored  GCR  carriage.  This  was  the  main  type  of  vehicle  used  in  the  train 



















146 Photograph of restored GCR carriage, accessed via https://images.stv.tv/articles/w768/614971- restored-train-
gretna-rail-disaster.jpg (05/09/2019) 
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Chapter  Three: 
“Aftermath  and  Significance  –  The  Forgotten  Disaster?” 
 
The  main  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  establish  the  period  after  the  events  of  the   
collisions  at  Quintinshill,  examining  the  immediate  aftermath  on  both  a  local  and   
national  level.  This  chapter  will  also  examine  the  subsequent  criminal  trial  to  unfold  at   
Edinburgh,  and  what  this  tells  us  about  the  attitude  towards  responsibility  and  culpability   
for  the  disaster  on  the  behalf  of  both  the  government  and  the  general  public.  The  main   
text  that  is  used  throughout  this  chapter  is  Richards’  and  Searle’s  book  investigating  the   
disaster.  This  is  due  to  events  in  the  aftermath  of  the  disaster  being  somewhat  unclear   
in  primary  documents.  Whilst  Richards’  and  Searle’s  account  of  the  events  after  the   
disaster  are  framed  very  much  upon  the  angle  of  establishing  responsibility  for  the   
disaster,  their  account  of  the  events  that  followed  does  provide  the  most  complete   
image  of  what  was  to  come  after,  and  as  such  is  helpful  to  use  in  examining  the   
aftermath. 
 
The  Immediate  Aftermath  
Before  examining  the  public  and  political  reactions  to  the  events  that  unfolded  at   
Quintinshill,  it  is  first  important  to  briefly  acknowledge  the  fates  of  the  survivors  and   
the  final  resting  places  of  those  not  so  fortunate.  Not  all  the  men  of  the  7th  Royal   
Scots  had  been  on  the  troop  train.  B  and  C  companies  had  in  fact  been  on  a  second   
troop  train  to  depart  from  Leith  later  that  day  and,  with  the  events  happening  at   
Quintinshill,  been  re-routed  using  the  Glasgow  and  South  Western  Railway’s  (G&SWR)  
Lockerbie  to  Dumfries  branch  line,  before  being  routed  back  onto  the  West  Coast   
Mainline  at  Gretna  Junction,  utilizing  the  G&SWRs  own  mainline  to  bypass  the   
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obstruction.147  At  4:30pm  in  the  afternoon,  the  men  of  A  and  D  companies  were  taken   
to  Carlisle  Citadel  station  to  masses  of  onlookers,  all,  it  appears,  determined  to  give  the   
soldiers  the  warmest  and  most  sympathetic  of  welcomes.  The  men  were  allowed  to   
wash  and  eat  before  having  a  medical  examination  and  being  ordered  to  rest  whilst    
stationed  temporarily  in  Carlisle  Castle.  So  admired  had  their  actions  been  in  the rescue   
effort  at  the  scene  that  when  paraded  at  2am  on  the  Sunday  morning  they  saluted  a   
passing  Lieutenant  General  travelling  in  a  car.  The  officer  stopped  the  car,  got  out  and   
returned  the  salute  to  the  surviving  men,  before  they  were  then  marched  back  to   
Citadel  station  to  board  a  train  comprised  of  only  first  class  carriages,  before  continuing   
the  journey  through  the  night  towards  Liverpool.148  The  total  number  of  soldiers  on   
board  this  train  was  seven  officers  and  57  other  ranking  men.  Perhaps  in  an  act  of   
small  mercy,  the  troops  of  the  7th   Royal  Scots  were  disembarked  from  the  ship   
expected  to transport  them  from  Liverpool  and  taken,  by rail,  back  to  Edinburgh  before   
being  sent  back  to  base  at  Leith  and  granted  14  days  worth  of  leave  to  spend  with   
their  families  and  the  relatives  of  those  killed  in  the  disaster.149  Over  200  of  their  initial   
number  had  been killed,  with  approximately  the  same  amount  being  in  hospitals  across  a   
distance  of  200  miles  of  northern  Britain.  These  men  had  been  transported  from  the   
scene  on  one  of  the  several  ambulance  trains  to  run  to  and  from  the  scene  throughout   
the  day,  the  first  of  which  arrived  in  Carlisle  at  10:12am,  followed  by  two  additional   
ambulance  trains  which  had  been  dispatched  from  Carlisle  to  the  scene  during  the   
course  of  the  morning,  and  arriving  back  in  Carlisle  by  noon.  Once  in  Carlisle,  the   
injured  were  then  taken  on  board  some  of  the  undamaged  coaches  of  the  express  train   
to  Canal  sidings  for  disembarkation  and  transferal  to  the  Cumberland  Infirmary150,   
 
147 Jack Richards & Adrian Searle, The Quintinshill Conspiracy: The Shocking True Story Behind Britain’s Worst Rail 
Disaster (Barnsley; Pen & Sword Books, 2015) pg. 47 
148 Richards & Searle, pp. 44-58 
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although  as  shall  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter,  this  initial  allocation  was  not   
sufficient  to  handle  the  numbers  of  injured.  
 
Once  back  in  Leith,  a  parade  of  the  victims’  coffins  was  transported  through  the  streets   
in  the  weeks  after  the  disaster  before  dedication  of  memorial  to  the  men  of  the 7th    
Royal  Scots  at  Rosebank  Cemetery  on  the  Edinburgh/Leith  border.  Those  killed  on  the   
local  train,  Mrs.  Rachel  Nimmo  and  her  baby  son  Dickson  were  buried  in  a  private   
family  funeral  at  Elswick  Cemetery  in  Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.  
 
A  Local  Issue?  
Initially,  the  public  reaction  to  the  events  that  unfolded  at  Quintinshill  were  limited  to   
the  response  of  local  people  in  towns  that  became  required  to  accept  the  injured  into   
their  hospitals.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  Cumberland  Infirmary  and  other   
hospitals  in  Carlisle  did  not  have  the  capacity to  deal  with  all  the  wounded  from   
Quintinshill  due  in  part  to  two  factors.  The  first  of  these  being  that  the  infirmary  had   
only  a  short  time  before  admitted  large  numbers  of  wounded  servicemen  from  the  front   
lines  in  France,  and  so  already  had  reduced  capacity.  When  this  was  combined  with  the   
second  factor,  this  being  the  vast  and  sudden  influx  of  wounded  from  the  scene  at   
Quintinshill,  meant  that  the  building  of  the  infirmary  became  so  congested  on  the   
morning  of  the  22nd  of  May  that  people  with  only  superficial  wounds  from  Quintinshill   
were  treated  outside  the  hospital  on  the  pavement  by  the  side  of  the  road,  and  that   
this  practice  had  been  utilized  for  around  180  cases  by  noon.  This  statistic   helps  to   
both  demonstrate  the  scale  of  the  disaster  and  the  problems  facing  the  Cumberland   
Infirmary  with  under  capacity  and  overdemand.151  Due  to  this  under  capacity,  the   
decision  was  taken  early  in  the  day  that  the  Cumberland  Infirmary  was  to  act  as   
 
151 Richards & Searle, pp. 44-58 
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accommodation  to  only  the  most  serious  of  injuries,  and  become  the  main  reception   
and  coordination  center  for  the  wounded  which  were  subsequently  sent  to  other   
hospitals  across  Carlisle.  In  addition  to  this,  the  military  commandeered  other   
accommodation,  including  hotels,  to  act  as  reserve  spaces  to  accommodate  the  injured.   
This  was  coordinated  from  a  separate  emergency  headquarters  to  that  at  the   
Cumberland  Infirmary,  established  by  the  military  authorities  in  the  County  Hotel.152  
 
This  undertaking  was  something  of  a  coordination  and  logistical  challenge  which  the   
Carlisle  authorities  had  not  faced  before.  20  individuals  were  transferred  to  Carlisle’s   
Chadwick  Hospital  but  again  this  was  soon  found  to  be  insufficient.  To  make  room  for   
the  injured  some  of  the  men  injured  in  France  were  transferred  to  private  homes,   
including  most  significantly  the  local  vicarage,  as  well  as  to  places  such  as  the  Central   
and  Viaduct  hotels,  Carlisle  Castle,  Chadwick  school  and  Fusehill  workhouse,  all  of  which   
within  a  few  hours  of  the  disaster  were  acting  as  makeshift  hospitals  and  having  their   
own  capacity  pushed  to  the  limits,  at  which  point  smaller  buildings  began  to  be   
utilized.153  By  the  afternoon  it  became  clear  that  the  capacity  within  all  of  the  separate   
facilities  within  Carlisle  was  not  going  to  be  able  to  meet  the  demands  being  placed   
upon  them  by  the  sheer  numbers  of  injured  arriving  in  the  city  from  the  Quintinshill   
site.  This  meant  that  hospitals  from  wider  afield  were  required  to  begin  accepting   
soldiers  who  had  lesser  injuries  and  were  considered  fit  to  travel  to  wider  locations.   
 
These  wider  locations  were  not  only  limited  to  northern  England  and  indeed  the   
locations  to  which  troops  were  sent  to  covered  both  travelling  north  and  travelling   
south.  Some  of  the  injured  were  sent  to  hospitals  in  Glasgow,  presumably  using  the   
 
152 Richards & Searle, pp. 44-58 
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G&SWR’s  diversionary  route  to  Scotland’s  second  city  to  bypass  the  obstruction  on  the   
West  Coast  Mainline,  whereas  other  troops  were  sent  to  hospitals  in  Penrith,  Lancaster   
and  even  as  far  south  as  Preston.154  The  first  of  the  transfers,  those  heading  towards   
Penrith  some  20  miles  away  from  Carlisle,  left  on  the  Tuesday  evening  after  the  hospital   
authorities  in  Carlisle  had  contacted  their  counterparts  in  Penrith  and  instructed  them  to   
make  arrangements  for  receiving  and  temporarily  accommodating  large  amounts  of   
injured  servicemen  in  some  of  the  city’s  hotels.155   It  is  noted  that  upon  arrival  of  the   
injured  men  from  Carlisle,  the  local  townspeople  of  Penrith  assembled  in  large  numbers   
to  watch  as  they  were  transferred  from  the  railway  onto  three  motor  ambulances  which   
were  used  for  taking  the  men  to  the  accommodation  arranged  across  the  city.  As  well   
as  this,  general  coordination  of  the  injured  from  the  continent  was  also  a  logistical   
challenge  that  needed  to  be  undertaken,  with  some  24  of  the  men  from  the   battlefields   
in  France  being  transferred  as  far  south  as  the  Liverpool  suburb  of  Fazakerley  in  order   
to  ease  congestion  in  Carlisle.156  However,  these  attempts  at  easing  congestion  in  Carlisle   
could  be  viewed  simply  as  one  way  traffic,  when  in  fact  this  was  not  the  case.   
Particularly  with  the  transfer  with  Liverpool,  the  authorities  in  Fazakerley  were  only   
willing  to  allow  troops  to  be  transferred  there  with  the  condition  that  the  Cumberland   
Infirmary  would  receive  some  of  the  more  seriously  injured  troops  in  an  exchange.157   
This  factor,  although  understandable  on  the  behalf  of  the  Liverpool  authorities,  would   
have  been  something  of  a  headache  for  the  authorities  back  in  Carlisle  who  were  faced   
with  having  to  accommodate  wounded  soldiers  from  Liverpool  whilst  at  the  same  time   
still  ensuring  that  the  injured  from  both  the  continent  already  under  their  jurisdiction,  as   
well  as  the  injured  from  Quintinshill  which  were  now  spread  across  not  only  Carlisle  but   
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some  200  miles  of  northern  Britain,  were  receiving  the  correct  care  and  attention   
applicable  to  the  nature  of  their  injuries.  
 
There  is  however  a  gruesome  factor  behind  the  numbers  arriving  from  the  Quintinshill   
site,  and  being  looked  after  by  medical  teams  must  not  be  overlooked,  regardless  of   
how  easy  it  might  be  too  loose  sight  of  when  presented  with  the  larger  statistics.  This   
factor  is  that  the  numbers  in  Carlisle  were  not  only  being  depleted  by  the  transfers   
across  the  north,  but  were  also  being  depleted  by  soldiers  succumbing  to  their  injuries   
and  dying  whilst  in  medical  care,  including  one  fatality  who  died  on  the  ambulance  train   
heading  too  Carlisle,  and  some  11  people  who  died  under  the  medical  care  of  the  city   
authorities.   
 
Press  Coverage 
Reporting  of  the  disaster  is  something  of  an  interesting  angle  in  which  to  examine  the   
disaster,  and  although  not  forming  the  main  basis  behind  this  research  project,  it  is   
perhaps  worth  mentioning  the  press  coverage  as  a  side  note  to  the  wider  public   
reaction.  Even  within  a  few  hours  of  the  accident  occurring,  reports  were  beginning  to   
appear  in  both  the  local  and  national  press.  The  first  angle  in  which  was  explored  by   
the  press  was  the  ‘heroism  amongst  horror’  trait  of  reporting  which  proved  popular  with   
reporters  as  it  was  almost  guaranteed  to  sell  to  the  general  public,  as  well  as  helping  to   
humanize  the  disaster  to  an  audience  who  perhaps  were  not  as  interested  in  the   
significance  that  the  disaster  played  for  the  railways  of  Britain.158  It  is  undeniable  that   
the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  disaster  brought  about  the  best  in  humanity  at  both   
the  site  and  in  Carlisle,  as  locals  immediately  began  searching  the  debris  field  and   
assisting  where  possible  with  the  rescue  operation.   
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However,  one  element  behind  the  whole  disaster  that  has  only  been  covered  in  select   
texts,  such  as  Richards’  and  Searle’s  account  of  the  events,  is  that  the  disaster  also   
managed  to  bring  about  the  worst  in  humanity  as  in  some  instances  human  curiosity   
gave  way  to  greed  and  the  desire  to  own  a  souvenir  from  the  scene.  Richards  and   
Searle  provide  in  their  book  an  account  from  a  Carlisle  local  named  Harry  Frost,  taken   
from  him  as  an  80  year  old  during  the  1965  50th  anniversary  commemorations,  in  which   
he  states  “It  was  a  terrible  affair,”  when  he  arrived  at  the  scene  on  the  Saturday   
afternoon,  and  that  “When  I  got  there  in  the  afternoon  there  were  billy  cans  and  all  
sorts  of  things  strewn  about  the  fields.  People  were  picking  up  souvenirs  but  I  didn’t   
touch  anything”.159  Richards  and  Searle  mention  that  it  is  thought  that  the  people  doing   
this  ‘souvenir  hunting’  were  not  the  local  residents  of  Gretna,  who  by  all  accounts  were   
commended  at  the  time  for  their  efforts  in  assisting  with  the  rescue  effort,  but  were  in   
fact  middle  class  people  from  Carlisle  as  well  as  other  places  who  had  come  to  the   
scene  to  see  what  they  could  salvage  for  themselves.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the   
general  attitude  in  the  locality  of  individuals  who  partook  in  this  activity  was  one  of   
being  no  better  than  graverobbers.160  
 
The  Scottish  papers  in  Edinburgh  and  Glasgow  broke  the  news  of  what  had  happened  at  
Quintinshill  shortly  after,  and  the  reporting  in  the  wider  Scottish  press  featured  less   
detail  than  the  press  within  the  border  region,  but  was  sufficient  enough  to  convey  to   
the  wider  Scottish  public  the  severity  and  the  scale  of  the  disaster.  The  public  reaction   
in  Scotland  was  one  of   stunned  astonishment  that  such  a  disaster could  happen  to   
Scottish  troops  before  they  had  even  left  their  homeland,  and  for  the  community  of   
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Leith  the  news  of  the  disaster  was  to  act  as  a  hammer  blow  the  likes  of  which  had   
never  been  felt  before.  Almost  every  person  living  in  Leith  were  either  related  to,  or   
knew  someone  involved  in  the  numbers  of  the  dead  from  the  troop  train,  and  the  idea   
of  their  relatives  being  considered  either  dead  or  missing  in  action  before  they  had  even   
left  Scottish  soil  was  something  that  many  struggled  to  comprehend.  Shortly  after,  the   
relatives  from  Leith  were  transported  from  Leith  to  Edinburgh  Waverley,  before  then   
being  conveyed  to  Carlisle  Citadel,  wherein  upon  their  arrival  the  relatives  assembled  on   
the  platform  to  hear  an  officer  from  the  7th  Royal  Scots  read  out  the  names  of  all   
those  either  known  to  have  been  killed,  or  whom  had  been  classified  as  missing  in   
action.  As  a  side  note,  it  has  also  been  detailed  that  Queen  Mary  approached  the   
Caledonian  Railway  (CR)  company  requesting  advice  on  what  they  thought  would  be   
suitable  gifts  from  the  royal  household  to  the  troops  injured  and  in  hospital.  The   
CR  referred  the  information  request  to  the  hospital  authorities  who  advised  the  Queen   
that  cigarettes,  chocolate  and  fruit  would  be  most  acceptable,  and  this  action  mirrors   
what  the  Queen  had  done  over  the  previous  Christmas  in  sending  cigarettes  to  the   
troop  in  the  trenches  as  a  token  of  royal  appreciation.161  Whilst  this  token  of  royal   
acknowledgment  would  have  given  the  troops  in  hospitals  across  the  north  some   
comfort,  the  major  gift  that  would  have  given  the  most  comfort  and  solace  to  the   
people  of  Leith  was  a  memorial  statue  dedicated  to  the  victims  and  erected  a  year  later   
in  May  1916,  most  notably  after  some  £4,000  had  been  raised  through  public  
subscription.  This  however  was  not  the  only  gift  for  the  people  in  Leith  as  also   
contained  within  the  provisions  behind  the  statue  was  the  providing  of  a  hospital  in   
Leith,  and  a  separate  fund  designed  to  help  the  relatives  of  the  victims  whom  may  have   
been  experiencing  financial  hardships.162  In  a  pre-NHS  era  and  in  an  period  of  time  in   
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which  the  majority  of  the  general  public  was  struggling  financially  due  to  the  war,  this   
outpouring  of  generosity  by  the  public  goes  some  way  to  show  that  this  disaster  was   
felt  by  the  whole  nation,  who  were  determined  to  help  look  after  those  left  behind.  It   
is  notable  that  the  press  coverage  of  the  disaster  appears  to  have  disappeared  from  the   
national  press,  although  not  from  the  local  press,  who  at  all  means  attempted  to  keep   
the  tale  of  Quintinshill  alive  and  beating  in  the  minds  of  their  readership.  One  potential   
explanation  for  the  apparent  disappearance  of  Quintinshill  from  the  national  press  is  the   
issue  of  censorship  during  the  war.  Although  mentioned  in  the  papers  at  the  time,  the   
press  was  heavily  censored  throughout  the  course  of  the  war  so  as  to  not  dampen   
wider  public  morale  and  keep  the  nation  willing  to  fight.  To  have  such  a  disaster   
happen  on  home  territory,  and  so  many  of  the  victims  be  active  servicemen  in  the  army   
would  have  been  a  huge  blow  to  public  morale,  and  the  timing  of  the  disaster,   
happening  during  the  height  of  the  shell  crisis  and  the  failing  campaigns  in  Gallipoli  and   
the  Dardanelles,  would  have  been  seen,  by  those  in  authority,  as  a  potentially  disastrous   
combination  amongst  the  wider  British  public.  Any  mention  of  the  events  that  took   
place  on  the  22nd  of  May  1915  in  the  national  press  after  the  immediate  aftermath   
period  referred  mainly  to  the  publication  of  Colonel  Druitt’s  inquiry  report  into  the   
disaster163  or  the  following  criminal  trial164,  and  this  is  demonstrated  in  an  extract  from   
‘The  Manchester  Guardian’  dated  the  20th  September  1915.  This  newspaper  extract   
states  that  “Lieutenant  Colonel  E.  Druitt,  the  Board  of  Trade  Inspector,  issued  on   
Saturday  his  report  of  the  inquiry  which  he  made  into  the  causes  of  the  double  railway   
 
163 The Scotsman, “The Gretna Railway Disaster: Inquest Opened in Carlisle”, 24th July 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (The 
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Jury”, 25th June 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (The National Archives); Pall Mall Gazette, Short Cutting, 1st October 1915, 
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collision  which  occurred  on  May  22  between  passenger  trains  at  Quintinshill  on  the   
Caledonian  Railway”.165  Also  contained  in  this  newspaper  cutting  is  the  statement  “The   
Inspector  finds  that  this  disastrous  collision  was  due  to  want  of discipline  on  the  part  of   
the  signalmen”  indicating  that  it  was  expected  by  the  public  that  Meakin  and  Tinsley   
would  take  sole  blame  for  the  disaster.  This  factor  is  interesting  to  mention,  as  it  is   
perhaps  one  method  behind  exploring  the  widespread  blaming  of  George  Meakin  and   
James  Tinsley  for  the  disaster,  and  could  potentially  be  seen  as  a  contributing  factor  in   
the  events  that  were  to  follow  the  disaster.  
 
The  Reaction  of  the  General  Public 
The  public  reaction  to  what  unfolded  at  Quintinshill  was  something  that  was  
unsurprising,  this  being  that  there  was  utter  disbelief  that  an  accident  of  this  magnitude   
could  happen  on  the  railway  network  which  was  considered  to  be  the  best  in  the   
world.  Patriotism  was  one  thing  that  the  British  war  effort  was  not  in  short  supply  of,   
and  this  was  fueled  by  the  coverage  on  war  news  in  the  press  which,  although  was   
subject  to  censorship  in  order  to  safeguard  public  morale,   was  keeping  the  general   
public  informed  about  the  major  aspects  of  the  war.  Only  two  weeks  before  the  events   
that  unfolded  at  Quintinshill,  the  Cunard  Liner  RMS  Lusitania  had  been  torpedoed  and   
sunk  eleven  miles  off  of  the  coast  of  the  Old  Head  of  Kinsale  in  Ireland  by  German  U- 
Boat  U-20,  with  the  loss  of  1,198  civilian  lives.166  As  such,  patriotism  within  the  general   
public  was  being  fueled  by  the  press  coverage,  in  particular  cartoon  images  which   
appeared  in  the  ‘Daily  Mirror’  with  the  tag  line  “The  Huns  carry  out  their  threat  to   
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murder”167,  referring  to  a  warning  message  that  had   appeared  in  the  ‘Brooklyn  Daily   
Eagle’  from  the  Imperial  German  Embassy  to  the  United  States  on  the  day  of  the  sailing   
from  New  York,  stating  that  the  ship  was  a  target  for  the  German  navy  and  that  any   
passengers  travelling  did  so  at  their  own  risk.168  In  the  instance  of  the  sinking  of  the   
Lusitania,  public  opinion  was  very  much  in  the  mindset  that  there  was  a  clear  villain  in   
the  tale,  this  being  the  German  Imperial  Navy,  yet  when  the  events  at  Quintinshill   
unfolded  only  a  fortnight  later  the  finger  of  blame  was  not  so  easy  to  point,  as  this   
was  very  much  a  home  grown  tragedy.  Given  this  atmosphere  of  increased  patriotism,  it   
was  natural  that  the  public  wanted  someone  to  blame,  fostered  in  the  belief  that  such   
an  accident  could  not  have  occurred  on  the  British  railway  network  accidentally,  and  this   
was  fueled  by  the  press  who  almost  immediately  began  speculations  that  this  latest   
disaster  to  strike  during  May  1915  was  the  result  of  enemy  action.  These  speculations   
however  soon  proved  incorrect,  at  which  point  the  focus  shifted  to  the  failings  of  the   
signalmen  on  duty,  and  particularly  on  the  actions  of  James  Tinsley.  Somewhat  unwisely,   
Tinsley  had  agreed  to  an  interview  with  the  local  press  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of   
the  disaster.  Although  this  report  contained  a  number  of  inaccuracies,  such  as  stating   
that  Tinsley  was  35  rather  than  his  actual  age  of  32,  the  report  went  some  way  to   
fueling  the  public  desire  for  details  from  the  scene  of  the  disaster.169  Of  particular   
interest  was  operational  information  about  actions  undertaken  in  the  signal  box  relating   
to  the  placement  of  trains  on  the  mainlines.  In  addition  to  this,  the  report,  contained  in   
Carlisle’s  own  ‘Carlisle  Journal’  did  dispel  one  wrongly  held  belief  surrounding  the   
disaster,  this  being  that  Meakin  and  Tinsley  had  been  a  arrested  immediately  after  the   
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disaster,  although  it  appears  that  they  had  been  escorted  from  the  scene  by  the   
police.170  According  to  Scottish  law  of  the  time,  investigations  in  preparation  for  a  fatal   
accident  inquiry  had  to  be  opened  almost  immediately,  and  this  task  was  undertaken  by   
the  Dumfrieshire  Depute  (deputy)  Fiscal,  a  man  by  the  name  of  James  Kissock.  The   
practice  involved  Kissock  taking  eyewitness  statements  which  were  not  to  be  used  in   
evidence  in  the  event  of  a  criminal  trial,  but  were  to  be  provided  to  magistrates  so   
they  could  gain  background  knowledge  on  the  case  and  the  types  of  information  that   
could  possibly  be  discussed  in  court.  The  result  of  these  initial  enquiries  was  to  lead  to   
the  arrest  of  Tinsley,  Meakin  and  Hutchinson.171   
 
Arresting  James  Tinsley  and  the  Criminal  Trial 
The  arrest  of  James  Tinsley  is  the  main  arrest  that  has  been  written  about  in  a  handful   
of  texts  about  the  disaster  and  the  aftermath.  The  arrest  was  not  to  happen  until  the   
28th  of   May,  a  full  six  days  after  the  events  themselves,  and  was  to  see  the  first   
warning  signs  that  perhaps  Tinsley  was  not  of  sound  mind  during  the  time  he  was   
working  in  the  signal  box,  as  well  as  the  questioning  of  Tinsley’s  mental  health  by   
authorities  other  than  the  CR.172  The  duty  of  arresting  James  Tinsley  after  the  approval   
of  the  Crown  Counsel  fell  to  the  Depute  (Deputy)  Procurator  Fiscal  for  Dumfrieshire,   
James  Kissock,  as  well  as  Inspector  Morrison  from  Annan.  The  two  travelled  to  Tinsley’s   
home  in  Gretna  to  arrest  him  on  the  charge  of  culpable  homicide,  but  were  unable  to   
arrest  Tinsley  outright  on  the  basis  of  concern  surrounding  his  mental  stability.  Both   
officers  later  wrote  that  when  they  reached  Tinsley’s  home,  they  found  him  unwell.   
Tinsley’s  family  also  informed  the  two  detectives  that  Doctor  Carlyle  of  Kirkpatrick,  an   
individual  whom  himself  had  aided  with  the  rescue  effort  at  the  scene  on  the  day  of   
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the  collision,  had  been  tending  to  Tinsley  in  the  days  following  the  disaster,  and  that  he   
had  left  clear  instructions  that  Tinsley  was  not  to  be  interviewed  or  spoken  to  by   
anyone,  the  reason  given  for  this  was  a  concern  that  if  care  was  not  taken  with  Tinsley   
“his  brain  might  be  affected”.173  This  is  one  area  of  the  Quintinshill  story  that  has  been   
overlooked  by  most  authors,  and  has  only  recently  entered  the  secondary  literature   
discussions  on  the  subject  due  to  an  oversight  of  authors  examining  documents.  What   
has  been  written  subsequently  states  that  Tinsley  was  escorted  from  his  house  on  the   
evening  of  the  28th  of  May  by  ambulance  and  taken  to  Dumfries  for  further  medical   
treatment,  the  reasoning  given  for  this  medical  worry  surrounding  Tinsley  is  the  noting   
of  him  suffering  from  epileptic  fits.174  The  issue  of  Tinsley  potentially  suffering  from   
epilepsy  has  been  touched  upon  briefly,  but  it  is  perhaps  important  to  stress  the   
importance  that  this  medical  condition  could  have  had  for  the  public  opinion  of  one  of   
Britain’s  main  rail  companies.  Had  news  about  Tinsley’s  mental  wellbeing  been  made   
public,  it  is  likely  that  the  public  opinion  as  to  attributing  responsibility  for  the  disaster   
would  have  shifted  away  from  Tinsley  and  become  aimed  more  towards  the  CR  for   
allowing  someone  with  such  a  medical  condition  to  be  involved  in  a  role  in  which  such   
high  safety  demands  were  being  placed  upon  the  individual.  Without  a  specific  diagnosis   
about  Tinsley’s  mental  wellbeing  it  is  difficult  to  state  whether  or  not  Tinsley  was   
suffering  from  epilepsy,  and  the  subject  has  been  sufficiently  examined  in  Richards’  and   
Searle’s  book  on  the  disaster.  What  is  important  to  note  for  the  purposes  of  this  study   
about  the  reaction  of  the  public  to  the  events  of  Quintinshill  is  that  by  the  time  of  the   
criminal  trial  in  Edinburgh,  Tinsley  was  perceived  to  be  of  sound  mind,  meaning  that  he   
was  allowed  to  stand  trial  in  the  dock  alongside  George  Meakin  and  George   
Hutchinson.175  
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It  is  perhaps  important  to  mention  the  significance  the  Druitt  report  played  in  the   
proceedings  of  the  trial.  By  utilizing  the  date  established  in  the  Manchester  Guardian   
article,  and  cross  examining  these  dates  with  a  September  1915  calendar,  it  has  become   
possible  to  establish  the  exact  date  in  which  the  Druitt  report  was  published.  The  article   
is  dated  the  20th  of  September176,  a  Monday,  and  claims  that  Druitt’s  report  was   
published  “on  Saturday”.  This  means  that  the  date  at  which  Druitt’s  report177  was   
published  was  the  18th  of  September.  However,  the  trial  in  Edinburgh  opened  a  full  four   
days  before  the  publication  of  the  Druitt  report,  and  as  it  is  mentioned  in  a  paper   
dated  the  20th  of  September  that  sentences  had  been  passed  on  the  individuals  standing   
trial178,  it  is  likely  that  the  report  itself  was  not  been  used  during  the  proceedings   
within  court,  and  that  instead,  statements  from  the  CR  representatives  in  court,  as  well   
as  any  company  documents  such  as  company  rulebooks  relating  to  the  rules  surrounding   
the  correct  operation  of  a  signal  box  were  likely  used,  the  main  line  of  argument  being   
that  is  was  the  want  of  discipline  on  the  behalf  of  the  signalmen  that  had  resulted  in   
the  disaster  occurring,  although  it  is  unclear  if  this  was the  case  regarding   
documentation  used  during  the  proceedings.  
 
The  criminal  trial  is  also  something  that  needs  to  be  looked  into  as  a  consequence  of   
what  unfolded  at  Quintinshill.  Initially  the  coroner’s  court  in  Carlisle  had  conducted  its   
own  inquiry  with  the  result  being  a  triple  indictment  of  Meakin,  Tinsley  and  Hutchison.   
Although  questions  have  subsequently  been  raised  as  too  the  authenticity  of  the   
information  provided  to  Coroner  Strong,  the  coroner  in  Carlisle,  and  the  amount  in   
which  Strong  relied  on  information  provided  by  the  CR,  which  naturally  was  attempting   
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1915, accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk  
177 Lieutenant-Colonel E. Druitt’s Inquiry Report, 18th September 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (The National Archives) 
178 The Manchester Guardian, “The Troop Train Disaster: Due to Signalmen’s Want of Discipline”, 20th September 
1915, accessed in PDF format via www.parlipapers.co.uk  
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to  deflect  as  much  of  the  responsibility  as  possible.  However,  the  Coroner’s  inquest  in   
Carlisle  became  something  of  a  problem  for  the  legal  process  that  was  to  unfold  at  the   
criminal  trial  regarding  location.  Due  to  the  location  in  which  the  accident  occurred,   
criminal  charges  and  the  subsequent  trial  needed  to  be  brought  before  the  Scottish   
Courts.  Indeed,  public  reaction  in  Scotland  was  that  of  fury  that  the  coroner’s  trial  was   
conducted  south  of  the  border  and  not  in  Scotland  where  the  accident  actually   
happened.  So  furious  was  the  backlash  that  the  St. Andrew’s  society,  a  society   
established  to  promote  all  things  Scottish  in  1907,  made  approaches  towards  Prime   
Minister  Herbert  Asquith  demanding  an  apology  from  the  Home  Office  for  what  they   
viewed  as  unconstitutional  action  undertaken  by  an  English  court  dealing  with  the  affairs   
of  a  Scottish  disaster  and  enquiry.  An  interesting  side  note  to  this  is  that  when  the   
issue  was  raised  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  Scottish  MP  Hugh  Watt,  the  Home   
Secretary,  Sir  John  Simmon  failed  to  acknowledge  the  case  in  Scotland,  citing  the  factors   
of  deaths  occurring  in  the  Carlisle  hospitals  as  well  as  other  hospitals  across  the  north   
of  England,  and  therefore  needing  investigation  under  the  English  legal  system.179 Upon   
his  arrest,  Tinsley  had  been  charged  with  culpable  homicide  by  the  Scottish  legal  system,   
and  as  such  he  had  to  stand  trial  in  Scotland,  rather  than  in  England.  This  means  that   
by  the  time  the  criminal  trial  took  place,  the  venue  chosen  was  Edinburgh,  a  location   
that  was  acceptable  to  both  the  Home  Office  and  the  Scottish  courts.  It  was  an   
unfortunate  side  effect  that  the  trial  of  the  three  men  indicted  after  the  coroner’s  case   
was  to  occur  merely  a  few  miles  away  from  the  community  in  which  most  of  the   
victims  had  been  based,  and  the  community  that  was  still  suffering  the  full  effects  of   
grief.   
 
The  trial  opened  on  the  14th  of  September  1915  at  the  High  Court  in  Edinburgh  with   
 
179 Richards & Searle, pg. 161 
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the  leader  of  the  prosecution  being  the  Lord  Advocate180,  Robert  Munro,  himself.   
Witnesses  for  the  prosecution  included  Robert  Killin,  the  stationmaster  of  Gretna  who   
opened  by  providing  an  account  of  the  events  on  the  morning  of  the  disaster,  as  well   
as  the  significant  and  notable  presence  of  representatives  of  the  CR,  and  this  factor  has   
raised  questions  as  to  the  fairness  of  the  trial  that  was  conducted.181  Whilst  this  angle   
is  an  interesting  one  to  investigate,  and  an  intriguing  insight  into  what  is  perceived  to   
have  happened  behind  the  scenes  of  power  during  a  time  of  war,  this  line  of  argument   
shall  not  be  explored  further  here,  given  the  constrains  that  an  exploration  of  this   
would  involve,  as  well  as  having  a  limited  relevance  to  the  operation  of  Britain’s   
railways  during  the  First  World  War.   
 
The  result  of  the  trial  was  that  the  judge  ordered  the  jury  to  formally  acquit  Hutchinson   
due  to  a  lack  of  evidence182  and  the  factor  that  he  had  not  been  present  in  the  signal   
box  at  the  time  of  the  collision,  and  guilty  verdicts  for  both  Meakin  and  Tinsley.  The   
evidence  used  against  Meakin  and  Tinsley  was  the  admission  of  both  men  to  the  late   
changeover  time,  as  well  as  admissions  of  a  lack  of  use  of  the  signal  lever  collars.  Little   
was  made  of  the  factors  that  the  CR,  against  the  orders  of  the  REC183,  was  still  allowing   
express  passenger  trains  to  take  priority  over  the  running  of  trains  designed  at  assisting   
the  war  effort,  and  that  in  the  months  prior  to  events  of  the  disaster  at  Quintinshill,   
the  operation  of  moving  trains  across  the  crossover  had  been  undertaken  at  Quintinshill   
several  times  without  mishap184,  and  that  a  factor  as  to  the  cause  of  the  disaster  must   
lie  with  the  sheer  amount  of  volume  of  traffic  being  placed  into  one  place  at  one  time.   
 
180 Richards & Seale, 161-176; Letter to the Lord Advocate, 17th September 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (The National 
Archives) 
181 Richards & Seale, 161-176 
182 Adrian Gray, Crime on the Line (Penryn; Atlantic Publishers, 2000) pp. 138-139 
183 Instructions to the General Managers of Railways in Great Britain as to the Working of Naval and Military Traffic 
on Mobilization, 4th August 1914, MT 6/2844 (The National Archives) 
184 Letter to the Lord Advocate, 17th September 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA) 
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Meakin  was  sentenced  to  18  months  imprisonment  whilst  Tinsley  was  sentenced  to   
three  years  penal  servitude185,  a  huge  proportion  of  the  trial  focusing  on  Tinsley’s  lapse   
in  memory  and  the  lack  of  use  of  the  signal  lever  collar,  a  factor  outlined  by  the  CR  in   
the  statements  they  provided  the  court  as  to  the  regulations  behind  operating  a  signal   
box.  Perhaps  a  side  note  that  is  worth  mentioning  is  the  fact  that  neither  Tinsley  or   
Meakin  served  their  full  sentences,  instead  being  released  from  prison  on  the  15th  of   
December  1916,186  15  months  after  they  had  been  sentenced,  and  that  instead  of  being   
called  up  to  the  armed  forces  upon  their  release,  the  two  men  returned  to  jobs  on  the   
railway,  Tinsley  also  being  allowed  to  keep  his  railway  cottage  for  the  duration  of  his   
imprisonment,  allowing  his  family  somewhere  to  live.  Both  men  however  did  not  return   




The  course  of  this  chapter  has  examined  several  different  aspects  of  the  Quintinshill   
story  to  occur  after  the  event  itself.  The  initial  public  reaction  was  very  much  centered   
on  the  local  response  to  the  tragic  events,  and  the  situation  regarding  the  ability  of  the   
authorities  in  the  region  to  deal  with  the  mass  influx  of  wounded  arriving  from  the   
Quintinshill  scene.  The  following  wider  public  reaction  was  initially  one  of  shock,  but  this   
was  soon  followed  by  the  search  for  answers  and  the  desire  to  see  some  form  of   
 
185 Colin G. Maggs, Great Britain’s Railways: A New History (Stroud; Amberley Publishing, 2018) pg. 266; Jon 
Mountford, Tom Dodds, Tony Evans & David Adams, British Steam Engines; The Ultimate Guide To The Greatest 
Steam Engines (Sywell; Igloo Books Ltd., 2010) pp. 148-150; Gray, pp. 138-139; Richards & Searle, pp. 161-176; Hull 
Daily News, “Troop Train Disaster: Close of the Carlisle Inquiry: Manslaughter Verdict”, 24th June 1915. MT 
6/24234/11 (TNA); East Anglian Daily Times, “Troop Train Disaster: Manslaughter Verdict by the Jury”, 25th June 
1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA); Pall Mall Gazette, Short Cutting, 1st October 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA); The 
Nottingham Guardian, Short Cutting, 20th September 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA); The Carlisle Journal, “Gretna 
Disaster: Railwaymen Charged with Manslaughter”, 17th September 1915, MT 6/24234/11 (TNA) 
186 Richards & Searle, pg. 209 
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justice  undertaken.  Acknowledgement  of  any  underlying  medical  conditions  appear  to   
have  not  been  made,  and  the  focus  of  both  the  public  and  official  blame  was  centered   
on  George  Meakin  and  James  Tinsley  due  to  the  ease  in  which  blame  was  attributed  to   
them.  This  was  due  to  their  admission  of  wrong  doing  in  the  form  of  the  late   
changeover  and  the  lack  of  use  of  the  signal  lever  collars.  This  focus  has  failed  to   
acknowledge  that  both  men  were  released  from  prison  early  and  allowed  to  resume   
jobs  on  the  railway  instead  of  being  called  up  into  the  armed  forces.  In  addition,  the   
role  of  the  CR  to  the  proceedings  is  also  something  that  has  had  a  severe  lack  of  focus   
from  both  documents  at  the  time,  and  in  subsequent  texts  detailing  the  disaster,   
although  this  focus  is  beginning  to  be  adopted  in  some  texts  and  helping  to  provide  a   
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Conclusions: 
The Importance of the Railways to Britain’s First World War 
 
To  conclude,  despite  the  recent  upsurge  in  interest  in  the  home  front  during  the  First   
World  War,  due  in  part  to  the  centenary  commemorations  which  have  occurred  over   
the  course  of  the  last  decade,  the  operations  of  Britain’s  railways  during  the  period  are   
a  severely  underrepresented  aspect  of  First  World  War  study.  Whilst  general  First  World   
War  literature  texts  that  have  been  written  previously  have  focused  on  the  political,   
economic  or  social  impact  the  conflict  played  in  wider  British  society,  little  focus  has   
been  placed  on  the  infrastructure  which  allowed  Britain  to  fulfil  her  First  World  War   
aims  throughout  the  course  of  hostilities.  What  has  been  written  focuses  mainly  on  the   
initial  mobilization  effort  of   the  railways  during  August  1914,  which  although  significant   
to  the  history  of  Britain’s  railways,  is  only  one  moment  contained  within  the  wider  war   
and  as  such  does  not  provide  a  fully  rounded  impression  of  exactly  what  it  must  have   
been  like  for  the  railways  for  the  duration  of  the  war.   
 
Specific  railway  history  texts  are  also  severely  lacking  in  their  coverage  of  the   
operational  dimension  of  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War  period,  choosing   
instead  to  prioritize  coverage  of  the  people  who  worked  on  the  railways  and  the   
pressures  that  they  faced  in  operating  a  network,  designed  in  peacetime,  in  a  wartime   
environment.  It  is  also  amongst  this  strand  of  literature  that  the  limited  studies  of    
Quintinshill  arise,  and  whilst  these  texts  do  place  Quintinshill  in  its  correct  contextual   
background,  none  of  these  texts  have  used  the  Quintinshill  disaster  to  examine  and   
question  the  state  of  operations  on  the  railways  of  Britain.  Focus  has  instead  been   
placed  far  more  towards  the  aim  of  discovering  the  responsibility  behind  the  disaster,   
with  older  authors  maintaining  the  traditionally  held  view  that  it  was  George  Meakin   
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and  James  Tinsley  who  were  responsible  for  the  disaster,  whilst  newer  authors  have   
begun  to  question  this  belief  and  instead  apportion  some  of  the  blame  at  the  feet  of   
the  Caledonian  Railway  (CR).  Whilst  this  focus  is  itself  fascinating,  it  is  unfortunately   
limited  in  its  ability  to  gain  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  operations  on  the  railways   
during  the  First  World  War.  It  was  this  task  of  trying  to  understand  the  operational   
dimension  of  the  railways  during  this  period  that  was  the  central  focus  of  this  research   
project,  and  to  begin  to  shed  light  on  one  of  the  more  underrepresented  fields  of   
British  First  World  War  enquiry.   
 
Research  undertaken  on  the  subject  of  the  Railway  Executive  Committee  (REC)  has   
shown  that  to  begin  with,  the  government  was  struggling  to  balance  the  needs  of  the   
war  effort  with  the  demands  of  private  industry.  As  the  system  that  emerged  was  state   
supervision  rather  than  state  nationalization  as  would  come  later  in  the  century,  the   
demands  of  private  industry  needed  to  be  accommodated  against  the  backdrop  of  mass   
mobilization.  What  has  become  clear  from  documents  held  in  the  National  Archives  is   
that  the  REC  was  prepared  to  interfere  with  the  provision  of  train  services  for  the   
civilian  population,  but  through  the  use  of  wider  incentives,  these  being  express   
passenger  and  local  passenger  trains  loosing  their  priority  over  all  else  status  and  traffic   
for  the  war  taking  precedent.  As  the  war  prolonged  into  1915  provisions  such  as  the   
curtailment  of  non-military  passenger  traffic,  the  withdrawal  of  certain  types  of   
passenger  rolling  stock,  including  through  carriages  and  dining  cars,  and  the  requirements   
to  economize  on  coal  used  for  railway  locomotives,  as  well  as  the  redirecting  of   
duplicate  traffic  to  use  alternative  routes  enabling  the  freeing  up  of  capacity  on  the   
wider  network  became  more  common  as  the  REC  coordinated  the  whole  network  to   
match  a  total  war  footing.  The  conveyance  of  goods  is  also  something  that  documents   
relating  to  the  REC  also  focus  upon  heavily.  The  goods  vary  across  a  wide  variety  of   
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materials,  but  the  main  ones  examined  in  this  study  are  the  fish  traffic  from  Scotland  to   
London  using  only  one  mainline  at  any  one  time  for  a  month  long  period,  thus  freeing   
up  capacity;  the  conveyance  of  food  items  destined  for  the  front  lines;  the  supply  of   
coal  traffic  from  South  Wales  to  the  base  of  the  Grand  Fleet  at  Scapa  Flow,  requiring   
use  of  the  Highland  Railway  and  it’s  network;  the  conveyance  of  mails  both  too  and   
from  the  front,  the  only  type  of  service  that  maintained  its  pre-war  ‘special’  status  and    
recognized  as  key  to  the  maintenance  of  morale  for  both  the  troops  at  the  front  and   
the  civilian  population  at  home;  and  finally  the  conveyance  of  hazardous  materials  for   
use  in  the  construction  of  weaponry.  Each  of  these  differing  tasks  help  to  exemplify  that   
the  operational  dimension  of  the  railways  became  centered  on  one  goal,  serving  the  war   
effort,  and  this  is  something  that  can  be  seen  far  more  after  May  1915,  at  which  point   
the  country  was  beginning  to  adopt  a  ‘total  war’  strategy  and  realizing  that  things  could   
not  simply  be  ‘business  as  usual’.  
 
The  Quintinshill  case  study  contained  in  chapters  two  and  three  are  also  insightful  for   
detailing  operations  on  the  railways  during  the  First  World  War,  and  the  pressures  that   
the  network  was  facing  at  this  point  of  the  conflict.  Examining  the  background  to  the   
event  itself,  mainly  in  the  local  geographical  context  of  the  Carlisle  bottleneck  heading   
towards  Scotland  leading  to  the  requirement  for  additional  storage  sidings  being  placed   
at  Quintinshill  in  the  years  before  the  war  helps  to  indicate  that  even  before  the   
outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  section  of  line  containing  Quintinshill  was  one  of  the  busiest   
in  the  nation,  and  that  this  was  only  made  more  congested  upon  the  commencement  of   
hostilities  as  differing  traffic  all  contended  for  running  paths  on  a  network  that  was   
itself  being  frustrated  by  existing  overuse.  Additionally,  the  situation  at  the  Quintinshill   
signal  box  in the  hours  before  the  initial  collision  is  also  examined,  including  detailing   
the  unauthorized  late  changeover  arrangement  present  between  signalmen  George   
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Meakin  and  James  Tinsley,  and  how  this  influenced  the  course  of  events  in  providing  a   
distraction  to  Tinsley  in  the  minutes  before;  as  well  as  detailing  the  placement  of  trains   
on  the  track  plan  at  Quintinshill,  and  how  this  led  to  the  head  on  collision.  By  using  the   
eyewitness  testimony  provided  in  Colonel  Druitt’s  enquiry  report,  it  has  also  been   
possible  to  detail  the  chain  of  events  immediately  after  the  first  collision,  and  the   
rescue  effort  which  took  place  after  the  second  collision,  hampered  mainly  by  the   
outbreak  and  ferocity  of  the  fire.  Additionally,  damage  reports  collected  after  the  clear   
up  operation  help  to  indicate  the  severity  of  the  disaster,  and  this  is  telling  of  the   
wider  issues  of  operations  on  the  railways  in  that  if  the  correct  procedures  are  not   
strictly  adhered  too,  the  result  would  be  accidents  of  this  nature  and  scale.  
 
The  aftermath  of  the  disaster  is  also  telling  of  the  state  of  mind  on  behalf  of  the  public   
and  the  state,  and  the  responses  of  each  to  what  unfolded.  The  immediate  aftermath   
and  the  provisions  provided  for  the  wounded  in  Carlisle,  which  soon  needed  to  be   
extended  to  include  some  200  miles  of  northern  Britain  just  to  accommodate  the   
numbers  wounded  by  the  collision,  help  to  exemplify  exactly  how  strained  Britain  had   
become  by  May  1915,  yet  despite  this  authorities  were  still  able  to  treat  the  wounded   
against  a  backdrop  of  existing  overcrowding  in  hospitals  across  the  north  with  the  return   
of  injured  servicemen  from  the  front.  This  immediate  aftermath  also  includes  the  initial   
reaction  of  locals  living  in  the  area,  and  how,  for  the  most  part,  they  aimed  to  assist  in   
any  way  they  could,  and  how  in  some  instances  people  were  known  to  take  items  from   
the  scene  at  Quintinshill  to  form  some  kind  of  distasteful  souvenir  of  the  events.  The   
coverage  of  the  disaster  in  the  press  links  in  with  the  reaction  of  the  wider  public,   
whose  initial  shock  that  such  a  disaster  could  be  allowed  to  happen  on  homeland  soil   
soon  dissipated  into  the  desire  for  answers  and  the  need  to  blame  someone  for  the   
events  that  happened.  The  final  aspect  of  the  aftermath  is  the  arrest  of  James  Tinsley,   
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the  subsequent  criminal  trial  which  took  place  in  Edinburgh,  and  the  eventual  early   
release  of  both  Tinsley  and  Meakin  at  the  end  of  1916.  Here,  questions  of  blame   
shifting  on  the  part  of  the  CR  have  been  raised  as  identified  in previous  texts.  What  is   
clear  from  the  criminal  trial  is  that  neither  Meakin  or  Tinsley  appear  to  have  helped   
themselves  by  admitting  to  the  unauthorized  late  changeover  arrangement  and  the  lack   
of  use  of  signal  lever  collars  as  outlined  in  the  rules  of  the  CR,  and  this  allowed  them   
to  become  easy  targets  to  accept  full  blame  for  the  disaster,  resulting  in  their  conviction   
and  subsequent  prison  sentences.  It  remains  a  question  as  to  exactly  what  extent  the   
CR  wished  to  divert  focus  onto  the  actions  of  the  signalmen  and  away  from  the   
situation  facing  the  railways  during  May  1915,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  adhering  to  the   
“war  traffic  before  all  else “  rule  of  the  REC,  and  whilst  this  research  project  to  does   
not  strive  to  provide  an  answer  to  this  question,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  that  it  is   
possible  the  government,  through  the  REC  was  allowing  the  CR  to  escape  media   
attention  and  assisting  with  the  imposition  of  the  blame  onto  the  two  signalmen.  
 
All  of  this  focus  has  allowed  for the  disaster  which  occurred  at  Quintinshill  to  be   
examined  through  the  prism  of  overpressure  on  the  rail  network,  and  the  provisions  in   
place  used  for  operating  the  railways  of  Britain.  Whilst  this  research  project  does  not   
claim  nor  aim  to  be  the  definitive  work  on  the  railways  of  Britain  during  the  First  World   
War,  the  key  task  behind  this  research  project  of  providing  some  coverage  to  the   
railways  of  the  Home  Front  in  Britain  during  this  period  has  been  achieved,  and  has   
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